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ABSTRACT. We offer a fresh understanding of how the Supreme Court's abortion
jurisprudence addresses laws that invoke not potential life, but women's health as a reason to
single out abortion for burdensome regulation that has the effect of closing clinics. The current
wave of health-justified restrictions- including laws that require abortion providers to secure
admitting privileges at nearby hospitals or to become the functional equivalents of hospitals
themselves -is destroying the clinic infrastructure on which women depend in order to exercise
their constitutional right to end a pregnancy.
How should judges evaluate the states' claims that such laws protect women's health? We
argue that such laws must actually serve the ends claimed for them if they are not to circumvent
constitutional limits on the means by which states can protect unborn life. Careful judicial
scrutiny is essential to vindicate values at the core of the Court's decisions in Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart.
We ground our argument in the principles of the undue burden standard as explained in
Casey and applied there and later in Carhart. Casey modified Roe v. Wade to provide that from the
beginning of pregnancy, states may protect two interests, unborn life and women's health. States
may express a preference for childbirth by trying to persuade a woman, through a twenty-four
hour waiting period and the provision of information, to forgo abortion. But states cannot
express a preference for childbirth in ways that obstruct women from acting on their
constitutionally protected choice.
Casey and Carhart allow the government to express respect for the dignity of human life by
means that respect the dignity of women. Regulations that close clinics in the name of women's
health, but without health-related justification, do not persuade: they prevent. In adopting such
regulations, states - along with the courts that defer to them - violate the principle at the core of
the Supreme Court's protection for the abortion right.
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INTRODUCTION
Many recently enacted laws restrict abortion not in the name of protecting
unborn life, but in the name of protecting women's health. States require that
doctors who perform abortions have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals or
require that abortion clinics be outfitted as "ambulatory surgical centers."'
These new laws single out abortion for burdensome, health-justified
restrictions not imposed on other medical procedures of similar risk.' As
legislators know or suspect, these requirements are unattainable for many
abortion providers.' As a result, these restrictive laws are forcing large numbers
of abortion clinics to close their doors.4 Before Texas intensified its regulation
of abortion providers through changes in its admitting privileges and
ambulatory surgical center laws, there were forty-one clinics remaining in the
state; enforcing the new law would close approximately three-fourths of them.s
1. See, e.g., Act ofJuly 12, 2013, ch. 1, §§ 1-12, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4795, 4795-4802 (West)
(codified at TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 5§ 171.0031, 171.041-o48, 171.o61-o64,
245.oo-on (West 2015) and TEx. Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 164.052, 055 (West 2015)); see also
infra Section II.A. "Ambulatory surgical center" is a regulatory term referring to a location in
which outpatient surgery is performed, limited to procedures not requiring an overnight
stay. See 42 C.F.R. § 416.2 (2015). These facilities are typically required to provide operating
rooms that meet the standards for those found in hospitals and to meet various other
physical, staffing, and administrative requirements. See, e.g., Whole Woman's Health v.
Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 682 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (discussing the requirement imposed by 25
TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 139-40 (2014)), afd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Whole
Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (Sth Cir.), mandate stayed pending judgment by 135 S.
Ct. 2923 (2015), and cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 499 (Nov. 13, 2015).
2. For a discussion of how legislators in Texas and Wisconsin singled out abortion providers
for special admitting privileges regulation, see infra notes 125-129 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, 76o F.3d 448, 457-58 (Sth Cit. 2014)
("Under this formulation, [the clinic] has demonstrated a substantial likelihood of proving
that H.B. 1390[ ]effectively clos[es] the one abortion clinic in the state .... ), petition for
cert.filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3705 (U.S. Feb. 18, 2015) (No. 14-997); Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 681
("If allowed to go into effect, the act's ambulatory-surgical-center requirement will further
reduce the number of licensed abortion-providing facilities to, at most, eight."); see also
Manny Fernandez, Decision Allows Abortion Law, Forcing 13 Texas Clinics To Close, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2ol4/o/o3/us/appeals-court-ruling-closes
-1 3-abortion-clinics-in-texas.html [http://perma.cc/XLS6-F97V] ("Thirteen clinics whose
facilities do not meet the new standards were to be closed overnight, leaving Texas -a state
with 5.4 million women of reproductive age, ranking second in the country-with eight
abortion providers, all in Houston, Austin and two other metropolitan regions. No abortion
facilities will be open west or south of San Antonio.").
5. See §§ 1-12, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 4795-4802. For a discussion of how the new law
changed application of admitting privileges and ambulatory surgical center requirements for
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Judges who strike down' and who uphold" these restrictions all cite as
authority the same Supreme Court decision from nearly a quarter century ago:
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.8 This is not as
surprising as it might at first seem. Casey was crafted by moderates responding
to concerns raised both by those who wanted to overturn Roe v. Wade9 and
those who wanted to preserve constitutional protections for the abortion
right."o The framework these Justices crafted allowed states more latitude to
restrict abortion in the interest of protecting potential life, but only as long as
women could make the ultimate decision whether to continue a pregnancy.
Casey has now been the law of the land longer than the unmodified Roe itself.
Fifteen years after Casey, a different majority-while more skeptical of the
abortion right- nonetheless applied the Casey framework in upholding the
Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act in Gonzales v. Carhart."
In what follows, we seek to understand how Casey addresses laws that
invoke not potential life-the interest at stake in Carhart-but women's health
as a reason to single out abortion for burdensome regulation that closes clinics.
A sharp circuit conflict over how judges are to evaluate health-justified
restrictions on abortion has placed the issue on the Supreme Court's docket in
Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt." Some circuits read Casey and Carhart to
require courts to examine whether health-justified regulations actually and
effectively serve health-related ends. Others construe the cases to prohibit
abortion, see infra notes 125-129. For a discussion of the statute's impact on abortion
providers, see infra text accompanying notes 109-110.
6. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F. SupP. 3d 949 (W.D. Wis.)
(enjoining Wisconsin's admitting privileges law), affd sub nom. Planned Parenthood of
Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 8o6 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2015); Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange
(Strange II), 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (enjoining Alabama's admitting privileges
law).
7. E.g., Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir.), mandate stayed pending
judgment by 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015), and cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 499 (Nov. 13, 2015); Whole
Woman's Health v. Lakey, 769 F. 3d 285 (5th Cir.) (overturning the District Court's
injunction against Texas's ambulatory surgical center requirement), vacated in part, 135 S.
Ct. 399 (2014); Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott
II), 748 F-3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014) (overturning the District Court's permanent injunction
against the Texas admitting privileges law).
8. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
lo. See infra text accompanying notes 42-46.
n. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
1. Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563.
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judicial inquiry of this kind and mandate judicial deference to the states'
claims.
We argue that Casey requires scrutiny of health-justified restrictions to
ensure that they actually and effectively advance health-related ends and do not
protect potential life in a manner the Constitution prohibits. We ground this
argument in an understanding of the constitutional values at Casey's core. Casey
both modified and affirmed Roe. Casey gave states more latitude to protect
potential life but only so long as states employed means that respect women's
dignity: "[T]he means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential
life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it"' and
cannot impose an "undue burden" on the abortion decision."s These values at
Casey's core should guide review of health-justified restrictions on abortion.
When states single out abortion for burdensome health regulations, courts
must confirm that the laws actually serve health-related ends and do not
instead provide a backdoor way of protecting potential life. Scrutinizing the
facts that justify laws targeting abortion for onerous health restrictions thus
serves a crucial anticircumvention function: it ensures that legislatures do not
employ health restrictions on abortion to protect unborn life by
unconstitutional means. Preserving the distinction between abortion
restrictions that protect women's health and abortion restrictions that protect
unborn life secures constitutional protection for women's dignity.
Our reading of Casey thus generates a fresh approach to health-justified
restrictions on abortion, sometimes called "TRAP laws" (targeted regulation of
abortion providers).'i States are enacting a variety of laws that impose special
health restrictions on abortion-whether expressly or impliedly on the ground
that abortion is "exceptional" because it involves the unborn.7 States play an
important role in protecting public health. But with an understanding of the
protection that Casey provides for women's choices, it becomes clear why states
cannot single out abortion for onerous health restrictions not imposed on other
procedures of similar or greater risk. Such laws may protect the unborn in ways
that Casey prohibits.
13. See infra Section II.B.
14. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
1s. Id. (defining an undue burden as a restriction that "has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus").
16. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
17. For a particularly vivid example of abortion exceptionalism, see infra text accompanying
notes 99-1oo. For other examples of singling out, see infra note 96 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Section I.B.
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The undue burden framework is the gateway for making these
determinations. The undue burden inquiry examines a law's purpose and its
effects, and courts must attend to both." A weak factual basis for the health
interest asserted may supply objective evidence of a purpose to impose a
substantial obstacle to women seeking an abortion.' Examining the factual
basis of a health-justified abortion restriction is also important in evaluating
the law's effects. Considering the extent to which a law advances the state's
interest in protecting a woman's health is crucial in determining whether the
burden it imposes on women's choices is warranted or "undue."'
In a series of recent judgments, courts have emphasized that Casey requires
inquiry into the facts that justify laws targeting abortion for onerous health
restrictions,' but the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected this view' in the Texas
case now in the Supreme Court, Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt.4
The Fifth Circuit asserted that it is wholly improper for judges to examine
the factual basis of the state's claim that a restriction on abortion promotes
women's health." The circuit applied deferential rational-basis review,
crediting without probing the state's claim to regulate in the interests of
women's health. To justify its use of hyperdeferential rational-basis review, the
Fifth Circuit invoked Gonzales v. Carhart, the Supreme Court's 2007 decision
that upheld the Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act.
But Carhart does not require judicial deference to the state's health
justifications for closing Texas clinics as the Fifth Circuit asserts. Very different
kinds of abortion restrictions are at stake. Carhart concerned a law enacted to
protect potential life, not women's health.' The law did not prohibit the
"usual" method for performing second-trimester abortions, but one less
ig. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 ("As with any medical procedure, the State may enact regulations
to further the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion. Unnecessary health
regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman
seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.").
2o. See infra Section II.C.3.
21. See infra Section II.C.3.
22. See infra Section II.B.
23. For the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, see infra Sections 1.B, II.C.
24. Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir.), mandate stayed pending jud gment by
135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015), and cert. granted, 136 S. Ct 499 (Nov. 13, 2015).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 161-176.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 162-164.
27. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) ("The Act expresses respect for the dignity
of human life."); see also id. at 146 (observing that "we must determine whether the Act
furthers the legitimate interest of the Government in protecting the life of the fetus that may
become a child").
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commonly employed.2 The law did not restrict access to abortion before
viability and closed no clinics. As the majority emphasized, "Alternatives are
available to the prohibited procedure."29
As importantly, Carhart itself applied Casey's undue burden standard and
insisted that "[t]he Court retains an independent constitutional duty to review
factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake."30 In determining
whether the ban on a particular method of later-term abortion required a
health exception, the Court reviewed and rejected multiple findings of fact by
Congress": "Uncritical deference to Congress' factual findings in these cases is
inappropriate."' Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit's decision flouted not only
Casey, but Carhart as well in reasoning about the review of abortion restrictions
as ordinary social and economic legislation unconnected to constitutional
rights."
Our analysis proceeds in two parts. In Part I, we develop a framework for
analyzing health-justified restrictions on the abortion right that is grounded in
an understanding of the core principles animating the Casey-Carhart line of
cases. After developing this approach to the health-justified restrictions on
abortion known as TRAP laws, we turn in Part II to contemporary litigation
over admitting privileges requirements for abortion providers, the most recent
effort to restrict access to abortion in the name of women's health. We argue
that courts applying both the purpose and the effects prongs of the undue
burden standard must examine whether a health-justified abortion restriction
actually and effectively serves the state's asserted health interests.
Constitutional guarantees for dignity require active review of this kind.
1. UNDERSTANDING CASEY: WHY COURTS NEED TO DIFFERENTIATE
BETWEEN LIFE AND HEALTH INTERESTS IN REVIEWING
ABORTION RESTRICTIONS
In this Part, we return to Casey and examine the values that guided the
Court's decision in that case. We then draw on this understanding of the
constitutional values at the core of Casey to build a framework for reviewing
health-justified restrictions on abortion.
28. Id. at 135 (distinguishing the "usual abortion method" in the second trimester from the one
prohibited by the challenged statute).
29. Id. at 164.
30. Id. at 165.
31. Id. at 165-66.
32. Id. at 166.
33. See infra Section II.C.i.
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A. The Values at Casey's Core
In Casey, Justices who sought to reaffirm and modify Roe prevailed over
those Justices who wanted either to reverse or to preserve Roe.4 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, along with Justices Scalia and Thomas, failed in their effort to
replace Roe's strict-scrutiny standard with rational-basis review of abortion
restrictions.3s Roe's author, Justice Blackmun, also failed in his effort to
maintain strict scrutiny and to preserve the trimester framework, which
prohibited government from restricting abortion to protect potential life until
the interest was deemed compelling at fetal viability, in the third trimester of
pregnancy.6  What emerged, in an opinion jointly written by Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, was the undue burden standard -a standard
that reaffirmed and modified Roe.
34. For this reason, advocates on both sides greeted the decision with overt dismay. In the
immediate aftermath of Casey, a prominent supporter of Roe declared that the Court had
deprived women of a fundamental right, while a prominent opponent ofRoe declared that
the Court had reaffirmed that fundamental right. Compare Roberto Suro, The Supreme
Court: Outside Court, Rival Rallies and Heavy Politicking, N.Y. TIMEs (June 30, 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/3o/as/the-supreme-court-outside-court-rival-rallies-and
-heavy-politicking.html [http://perma.cc/HLH8-6G8R] (quoting Judith L. Lichtman, an
abortion-rights advocate and president of the Women's Legal Defense Fund, declaring
shortly after Casey that "American women no longer have the fundamental right to make
decisions about their own lives"), with Sara Fritz, The Abortion Decision: Ruling Pleases
Neither Side; Both Vow To Continue Fight: Debate: The Opposing Camps Turn Their Attention
to Upcoming Elections and the Future Makeup of the Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES (June
30, 1992), http://articles.latimes.com/1992-o6-3o/news/mn-'3oi-i-supreme-court [http://
perma.cc/7YCD-SNA7] (quoting James Bopp Jr., general counsel for National Right to Life
Committee, declaring shortly after Casey that "[iut's a major loss to have a fundamental right
to abortion upheld by the court"), and Fritz, supra (quoting Randall Terry, an anti-abortion
leader and founder of Operation Rescue, announcing just after Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter voted in part to strike down an abortion restriction in Casey that "[tfoday the
three Reagan-Bush appointees have stabbed the pro-life movement in the back and affirmed
the bloodshed").
35. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 966 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("A woman's interest in having
an abortion is a form of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, but States may regulate
abortion procedures in ways rationally related to a legitimate state interest." (citation
omitted)); id. at 981 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
("[A]pplying the rational basis test, I would uphold the Pennsylvania statute in its
entirety.").
36. See id. at 929-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part); see also Strange II, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1337-38 (striking down an admitting
privileges law under Casey and describing the undue burden standard as a "'middle ground'
between those who would impose strict-scrutiny review of such regulations and those who
would require only a rational basis" (quoting Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange
(Strange 1), 9 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1282 (M.D. Ala. 2014))).
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The authors of the joint opinion addressed a nation polarized over
abortion, acknowledged core commitments of Roe's critics and proponents,
and integrated these competing commitments into the new undue burden
framework. Criticizing Roe's strict scrutiny of previability abortion restrictions
on the ground that it "undervalues the State's interest in the potential life
within the woman,""7 the joint opinion asserted that the state's "profound
interest in potential life" " offered a reason for regulation of abortion throughout
pregnancy. But the joint opinion nonetheless imposed constitutional limits on
the means by which government can protect its interest in potential life: "[T]he
State may take measures to ensure that the woman's choice is informed, and
measures designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as
their purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.""
While government can restrict access to abortion in the interest of persuading a
woman to continue a pregnancy, it cannot do so by means that impose an
"undue burden" on a woman's decision. The joint opinion defined an "undue
burden" as "a state regulation [that] has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus."'4 It explained: "A statute with this purpose is invalid because the means
chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform
the woman's free choice, not hinder it.""' In this way, a majority of the Casey
Court - the three authors of the joint opinion and the two Justices who refused
to modify Roe's trimester framework*- reaffirmed the Constitution's
protection for a woman's decision whether to carry a pregnancy to term.43 A
different majority of the Court-the three authors of the joint opinion and the
four Justices who would have construed Roe in a rational-basis framework-
allowed regulation of a woman's decision whether to carry a pregnancy to term
in ways that Roe had previously barred."
37. Casey, 505 U.S. at 875.
38. Id. at 878.
39. Id. Casey also preserves a health exception for women. See id. at 846.
40. Id. at 877.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. These Justices would have preserved Roe's trimester framework and thus were prepared to
offer as much protection as the undue burden standard provided -and more. See id. at 922,
934 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part); id. at 914 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
44. Although parts of the joint opinion received only three votes, the joint opinion still
represents the holding of the Court according to the rule established in Marks v. United
States. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court
1436
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From the struggle within the Court thus emerged a holding that respects
both a woman's constitutionally protected right to decide whether to continue
a pregnancy and the government's interest in persuading her to do so. Where
Roe forbade all efforts to protect potential life before the point of fetal
viability,4s Casey permits government efforts to persuade a woman to choose
childbirth beginning in the earliest stages of pregnancy-so long as the
government protects potential life by means that do not unduly burden a
woman's right to make "the ultimate decision" about whether to carry a
pregnancy to term.46
This limitation is crucial. It authorizes the government to protect potential
life by means that recognize and preserve women's dignity: "These matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."' The Court thus designed
Casey's undue burden framework to give legal form to two values - potential
life and the dignity of women - and to guide the coordination of these values4:
"The joint opinion adopts an undue burden framework that allows
government to regulate abortion in ways that respect the dignity of life, so long
as the regulation respects the dignity of women."49 It is because Casey
vindicates multiple constitutional values that the government is limited in the
ways it can protect potential life. If government wants to protect unborn life, it
has to respectfully enlist women in this project and cannot simply commandeer
women's lives for these purposes.
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on
the narrowest grounds . . . ."' (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))).
Chief Justice Rehnquist subsequently characterized the Casey joint opinion in these terms.
See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 952 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (affirming
that "[d]espite my disagreement with the opinion, under the rule laid down in [Marks], the
Casey joint opinion represents the holding of the Court in that case").
45. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 ("With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in
potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability.").
46. Casey, 505 U.S. at 875.
47. Id. at 851.
48. See id. at 876 ("In our view, the undue burden standard is the appropriate means of
reconciling the State's interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty."). The
Court reiterated this understanding of the undue burden framework in Gonzales v. Carhart.
550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) (observing that Casey's undue burden standard "struck a balance"
between protecting "the woman's exercise of the right to choose" and the ability of the state
to "express profound respect for the life of the unborn" (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877)).
49. Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694,1751 (20o8).
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In this way, the joint opinion structured the undue burden standard as a
framework in which Americans might negotiate the conflict over abortion so
deeply dividing the nation. The Court allowed the community to give voice to
deeply held antiabortion sentiment while nonetheless insisting that the
Constitution protects a woman's right to make her choice. These dual concerns
guided the joint opinion's application of the undue burden standard to the
provisions of the Pennsylvania statute at issue in the case.
B. How Casey Applied the Undue Burden Standard to Life- and Health-
Justified Restrictions on Abortion
In reviewing Pennsylvania's restrictions on abortion, Casey dealt principally
with regulations justified as protecting unborn life. We begin by examining
these more familiar portions of the decision and show how the Court's
application of the undue burden standard requires that any effort to protect
unborn life use dignity-respecting modes of persuading women. We then turn
to a short section of the Casey decision that upholds recordkeeping
requirements as promoting women's health. Few attend to this portion of the
opinion, but it is an integral part of the undue burden framework and
illustrates how courts ought to evaluate restrictions that claim a health-based
rationale.
Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act of 19820 promoted the state's interest
in potential life in several ways. The first was a counseling requirement
directing doctors to provide information about the abortion procedure, the
relative risks of abortion and childbirth, embryonic and fetal development, and
available resources should the woman choose to carry the pregnancy to term.s"
In the years before Casey, laws requiring statements intended to discourage
abortion had been held unconstitutional in the 1983 decision, City ofAkron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,s2 as well as in a subsequent decision,
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists.s" The Court had
held that such efforts at dissuasion improperly deterred women in the exercise
So. Act of June 11, 1983, No. 138, 1982 Pa. Laws 476.
51. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 5 3205(a)(2)(i) (2014) ("The department publishes printed materials
which describe the unborn child and list agencies which offer alternatives to abortion and
that she has a right to review the printed materials and that a copy will be provided to her
free of charge if she chooses to review it.").
S2. 462 U.S. 416, 442 (1983).
53. 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986).
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of a constitutionally protected choice and interfered with the physician-patient
relationship.'
Assuming that the Pennsylvania statute required "the giving of truthful,
nonmisleading information,"ss Casey overturned those precedents in significant
part. The controlling joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
said: "[W] e permit a State to further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of
the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature
and informed, even when in so doing the State expresses a preference for
childbirth over abortion."56 The Court reasoned that the decision remained the
woman's because, although the state may have engaged in directive counseling
at odds with normal informed-consent practice,' it did not supply false or
misleading information. The Court thus understood the state to vindicate its
interest in protecting unborn life by means consistent with the dignity of
women.
The second Pennsylvania regulation the Court reviewed required a woman
to wait twenty-four hours after receiving the information about fetal
development before she could proceed with an abortion. Again the Court
balanced the extent to which the regulation advanced the state's interest in
protecting potential life against the burden it imposed on a woman's choice to
end a pregnancy. Whether this regulation imposed an undue burden was "a
closer question," the joint opinion said, given that it required an additional
doctor visit and would predictably lead to additional cost and travel time." But
"[t]he idea that important decisions will be more informed and deliberate if
they follow some period of reflection does not strike us as unreasonable," the
opinion said." The Court allowed the state to impose modest costs and
burdens on the exercise of choice as incidental effects of the state's efforts to
persuade .6 "What is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate
s. See, e.g., id. at 762.
55. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
56. Id. at 883.
57. See Siegel, supra note 49, at 1754-58, 1755 n.168 (explaining how Casey permits some
departure from ordinary informed-consent practices).
58. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-86.
59. Id. at 885.
6o. See id. at 874 ("The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at
the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to
procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it."). As these passages illustrate,
determining whether a regulation that advances the state's interest in life or in health
imposes an "undue burden" always involves balancing. For further discussion, see infra text
accompanying notes 222-224.
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decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so.",6 Unlike Roe
and the Akron and Thornburgh decisions, Casey recognizes a community
interest in dissuading women from choosing abortion and authorizes states to
facilitate that effort, even if it imposes modest additional costs. States may
engage women in conversation with the community that seeks to change her
mind, so long as they do so in ways that do not unduly burden or obstruct her
ultimate choice. In this respect as well, Casey understands the state to
vindicate its interest in protecting unborn life by means consistent with the
dignity of women.
The third significant regulation the Court considered in Casey was the
requirement for a married woman to notify her husband before obtaining an
abortion: doctors who provided an abortion without receiving a signed
statement to that effect would lose their license and would be liable to the
husband for damages. The Court concluded that the burden imposed by this
requirement was undue. At least two different kinds of considerations
informed this conclusion. First, the state had structured the decision-making
process in a way that risked endangering those women who would not
voluntarily discuss the decision with their husbands as, the Court observed, the
overwhelming majority of women do63: "We must not blind ourselves to the
fact that the significant number of women who fear for their safety and the
safety of their children are likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion as
surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all cases."64
But the fact that the decision-making process was structured to expose
women seeking an abortion to the risk of domestic violence was not the only
constitutional flaw in the spousal-notice requirement. In a remarkable four-
61. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
62. Id. ("Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State,
or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the
unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of the
right to choose.").
63. Id. at 894 (observing that "about 95% [of married women] notify their husbands of their
own volition").
64. Id. In defending the spousal-notice requirement, the state had argued that because only
twenty percent of women seeking abortions were married, and ninety-five percent of those
women voluntarily notified their husbands, the notice requirement affected only one percent
of women and thus could not be deemed facially invalid. In rejecting this argument, the
joint opinion observed: "The analysis does not end with the one percent of women upon
whom the statute operates; it begins there. Legislation is measured for consistency with the
Constitution by its impact on those whose conduct it affects." Id. The joint opinion
concluded that the impact "must be judged by reference to those for whom it is an actual
rather than an irrelevant restriction." Id. at 895. Viewed from this perspective, "in a large
fraction of the cases in which [the spousal notice requirement] is relevant, it will operate as a
substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion." Id.
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page discussion, the Court explained that the state could not vindicate its
interest in protecting potential life by requiring a woman to notify her husband
before obtaining an abortion because structuring the decision-making process
in this way reflected and perpetuated a long-standing, but now
unconstitutional, understanding of the marital relationship.6s "The husband's
interest in the life of the child his wife is carrying does not permit the State to
empower him with this troubling degree of authority over his wife. The
contrary view leads to consequences reminiscent of the common law."6 6 Casey
prohibits the state from requiring a woman to place her constitutionally
protected decision in her husband's hands, even to save potential life; instead,
it requires the state to save potential life only by means that respect women's
dignity. "A State may not give to a man the kind of dominion over his wife that
parents exercise over their children."67
These passages of Casey do more than prohibit the government from
coercing women into continuing a pregnancy. Casey goes farther and limits the
manner in which the government may persuade women to continue a
pregnancy. For example, Casey allows the government to dissuade women
from choosing abortion, but only by providing information that is "truthful"
and "nonmisleading."68 The government may not provide a woman false or
misleading information that might persuade her to continue a pregnancy,"'
presumably because it would transform the woman into the government's
instrument for childbearing. In barring this mode of persuasion, Casey
prohibits the government from protecting potential life through means that
deny women liberty and equality. A principled understanding of this kind also
led the Court to strike down the spousal-notice provision. The government
may not require a woman to tell her husband of her decision to end a
pregnancy, even if it begins a conversation that saves a potential life, because
persuasion under these conditions perpetuates the husband's historic forms of
authority over his wife.70 Casey holds that governments may not structure the
decision-making process in this way, even in nonabusive relationships, because
it denies women liberty and equality.' These different applications of the
65. See id. at 887-98. Casey's discussion of the spousal-notice requirement ranges over eleven
pages, of which the last four cover constitutional concerns raised by its perpetuation of
common-law understandings of the marriage relationship. Id.
66. Id. at 898.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 882.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 898.
p. Id.
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undue burden framework show Casey's core values at work: the government
may persuade women to forego abortion and thus to protect potential life -but
only if the government employs modes of persuasion that are, in the Court's
view, consistent with the dignity of women.
In reviewing the Pennsylvania statute, Casey addresses health-justified
regulation of abortion as well as fetal-protective restrictions. The joint opinion
begins its discussion of how Casey governs the regulation of abortion with a
statement of principles setting forth how its undue burden standard separately
applies to laws promoting each of these state interests." The joint opinion
makes clear that some health-justified regulations are permissible, while others
are not:
As with any medical procedure, the State may enact regulations to
further the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion.
Unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of
presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion
impose an undue burden on the right.'
The Court thus allows regulation of abortion in the interest of protecting
women's health to the extent that it is consistent with ordinary medical practice
("as with any medical procedure")." But the Court prohibits as an undue
burden health-justified regulations that are "unnecessary" and have the
"purpose or effect" of making access to abortion substantially more difficult."
As we discuss below, singling out abortion for onerous regulation not applied
to other medical procedures of similar risk is thus suspect in this framework."6
A final section of the joint opinion applies these principles to the one
provision of the Pennsylvania statute at issue that regulated abortion in the
interests of public health. The Pennsylvania law required providers to report
information to the state about their practice of abortion." The Court viewed
Pennsylvania's reporting requirements as protecting women's health,
72. Id. at 878-79. Both Roe and Casey clearly distinguish between the state's interest in
protecting women's health and in protecting unborn life. In Roe, the Court authorized the
state to regulate abortion in the interests of protecting women's health and protecting
unborn life at different stages of pregnancy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
While eliminating the trimester framework and authorizing government regulation
promoting each of these interests throughout pregnancy, Casey continues to treat the two
state interests as analytically distinct. Casey, sos U.S. at 878-79-
73. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 101-103.
77. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3214 (2014).
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distinguishing that interest from the state's interest in protecting potential life
by dissuading women from ending a pregnancy:
Although [the requirements] do not relate to the State's interest in
informing the woman's choice, they do relate to health. The collection of
information with respect to actual patients is a vital element of medical
research, and so it cannot be said that the requirements serve no
purpose other than to make abortions more difficult. Nor do we find
that the requirements impose a substantial obstacle to a woman's
choice. At most they might increase the cost of some abortions by a
slight amount. While at some point increased cost could become a
substantial obstacle, there is no such showing on the record before us.
In this passage, Casey discusses how the undue burden analysis applies to
restrictions on abortion justified on the grounds, not of protecting unborn life,
but of protecting women's health. In applying undue burden analysis, the
Court separately considers both the purpose and effect of the regulation. In this
passage, it is clear that a regulation enacted for the putative purpose of
protecting women's health must in fact promote health to justify imposing
increased costs on the practice of abortion. A restriction on abortion enacted for
the claimed purpose of protecting women's health is not constitutional if it
"serve[s] no purpose other than to make abortions more difficult."' But the
Court does not examine purpose as the sole criterion of constitutionality. The
undue burden framework is equally concerned with effects, leading the Court
to inquire whether the reporting requirement "impose[s] a substantial obstacle
to a woman's choice."" The Court allows regulation that promotes health,
even if the health regulation had the incidental effect of increasing abortion's
cost "by a slight amount" - reserving the question of the conditions under
which increased costs become a "substantial obstacle."8 '
78. Casey, 505 U.S. at 900-ox (emphasis added). The only section of the reporting requirements
the Court declined to uphold required doctors to report to the state a woman's reasons for
not notifying her husband about her choice to terminate a pregnancy. Id. at 901.
79. Id.
8o. Id.
81. Id. The few lower-court decisions that cite this passage have typically invoked it only for the
proposition that a marginal increase in the cost of an abortion does not constitute an tndue
burden. See, e.g., A Woman's Choice-E. Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp.
1434, 1453 (S.D. Ind. 1995) ("However, the joint opinion in Casey shows that increased cost
and inconvenience, apparently even for little or no actual benefit, do not establish an undue
burden in the sense that the law would actually prevent women from having abortions they
would choose to have."); see also Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696
F.3d 490, 512 (6th Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., dissenting in part) ("Casey also affirmed additional
reporting requirements, because at most they might increase the cost of some abortions by a
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Few have engaged seriously with these passages discussing the application
of undue burden analysis to abortion restrictions enacted in the interest of
protecting women's health as distinct from protecting fetal life." In what
follows, we discuss the constitutional values and practical considerations that
might guide courts reviewing health-justified restrictions on abortion, known
as TRAP laws.
C. TRAP Laws in the Casey Framework
Casey applies the same undue burden framework to restrictions on abortion
enacted in the interest of protecting both potential life and women's health.
Yet, as we show, Casey requires applying undue burden with attention to the
differences between these two regulatory interests.
In discussing the application of the undue burden standard to health-
justified restrictions on abortion, Casey expresses concern about health
restrictions that are needed and those that are "unnecessary" or pretextual."
What might prompt this concern? When the Court cautions against
"[u]nnecessary health regulations"4 or health-justified restrictions that "serve
no purpose other than to make abortions more difficult,""s the Court seems to
be concerned about legislative subterfuge: while talking in terms of women's
health, the legislature may be trying to make access to abortions "more
difficult" to protect unborn life. Presumably it is the effort to evade
constitutional restrictions on the means by which government may protect
unborn life that would animate subterfuge of this kind. Recall that Casey
slight amount. While at some point increased cost could become a substantial obstacle, there
is no such showing on the record before us."); Davis v. Fieker, 952 P.2d 505, 515 (Okla. 1997)
("[A]n increase in cost, the risk of delay, a limit on a physician's discretion, and particularly
burdensome effects do not necessarily place an undue burden on the right to have an
abortion.").
82. No cases appear to engage with the passages of Casey discussing the reporting requirement.
There are, however, cases that address the discussion of undue burden and health
restrictions on abortion that appears in the part of the joint opinion in which its three
authors state the principles governing their analysis. For an early case, see Tucson Women's
Clinic v. Eden, 379 F-3d 531, 539-40 (9th Cir. 2004), which quotes Casey, 505 U.S. at 878, for
the proposition that, "[a]s with any medical procedure, the State may enact regulations to
further the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion. Unnecessary health regulations
that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an
abortion impose an undue burden on the right." Several recent decisions quote the language
on health restrictions that appears in the summary. See, e.g., infra notes 155, 223 and
accompanying text.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 73-78.
84. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
8s. Id. at goo-ol.
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imposes constitutional limits on the means by which government can protect
its interest in potential life: "[T] he State may take measures to ensure that the
woman's choice is informed, and measures designed to advance this interest
will not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the woman to
choose childbirth over abortion."16
To preserve Casey's core protection for a woman's decision, judges have to
review health-justified restrictions on abortion in order to ensure that they
actually serve health-related ends and do not instead protect potential life by
unconstitutional means -that is, by obstructing a woman's access to abortion
without attempting to reason with her about her decision.
Yet how are judges to distinguish between constitutional and
constitutionally suspect forms of health regulation? States are, of course,
entitled to regulate the practice of medicine as a matter of their police power,8 '
and judges, as a longstanding matter of federalism, will be loath to interfere
with that prerogative. For example, five years after Casey, the Court in Mazurek
v. Armstrong, a brief per curiam opinion, upheld a Montana law providing that
only a doctor could perform an abortion.8" The Court emphasized that
physician-only requirements of this kind had been sustained in its prior cases,
including both Roe and Casey.8' As the regulation at issue in Mazurek would
not force any woman "to travel to a different facility," the Court judged its
effects minimal.9 o The Court declined to find Montana's physician-only
requirement unconstitutional in purpose in light of the Supreme Court's
several cases sanctioning physician-only requirements, the requirement's
minimal effects on abortion access, and the fact that similar rules existed in
forty other states."
But at some point the state's police power may be exercised in such a way
as to violate a constitutionally protected right. Casey itself seems to offer some
86. Id. at 878 (emphasis added); see also id. at 877 ("[T]he means chosen by the State to further
the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it."
(emphasis added)).
87. State regulation of medical practice dates to the nineteenth century, and state authority was
affirmed by the Court in Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889), which upheld state
licensing requirements. See Richard E. Burney, Oversight ofMedical Care Quality: Origins and
Evolution, 1oi J. MED. REG. 8,io (2015).
88. 520 U.S. 968 (1997).
8g. Id. at 973-74 (emphasizing that "[o]ur cases reflect the fact that the Constitution gives the
States broad latitude to decide that particular functions may be performed only by licensed
professionals, even if an objective assessment might suggest that those same tasks could be
performed by others" (emphasis omitted) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 885))-
go. Id.
91. Id. at 973.
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guidance for courts in distinguishing between regulations of the practice of
medicine that are a legitimate exercise of the police power and regulations of
the practice of medicine that may run afoul of a constitutional right. In
upholding Pennsylvania's reporting requirement, the Court emphasizes that
"[t]he collection of information with respect to actual patients is a vital element
of medical research."9 2 The Court reasons that the reporting requirement
conforms to the general regulation of the practice of medicine outside the
abortion context, and that benchmark seems to guide the Court in upholding
the law against constitutional challenge.93
The reporting requirements upheld in Casey differ in this important respect
from TRAP laws enacted across the nation that target abortion providers for
burdensome regulation." Such regulations impose requirements on abortion
providers that are not imposed on other medical practices of similar or even
greater risk.95 It is increasingly common for state health and safety laws to
single out abortion in various contexts- including the licensing of clinics and
the regulation of practices such as telemedicine, admitting privileges, and
prescribing drugs off-label-and judges have raised concerns about this
differential treatment as an indicator of unnecessary regulation and potential
unconstitutionality.96
92. Casey, So5 U.S. at 9oo-o.
93. In summarizing the decision's guiding principles, the authors of the joint opinion again
invoke this comparative benchmark: "As with any medical procedure, the State may enact
regulations to further the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion." Id. at 878. For
the full quotation, see supra text accompanying note 73.
94. See, e.g., State Policies in Brief Targeted Regulation ofAbortion Providers, GUTTMACHER INST. 1
(Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibTRA-P.pdf [http://
perma.cc/7WQV-9PZY] ("Efforts to use clinic regulation to limit access to abortion, rather
than to make its provision safer resurfaced in the 1990s and have gained steam since
2010."); see also Dawn Johnsen, "TRAP"ing Roe in Indiana and a Common-Ground
Alternative, 118 YALE L.J. 1356, 1369 (2009) (describing as a TRAP bill a bill that
"targeted abortion providers with onerous regulations that were not supported by health or
safety needs"); Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP), CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS.
(Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.reproductiverights.org/project/targeted-regulation-of-abortion
-providers-trap [http://perma.cc/BE66-MWY4] ("'TRAP' laws single out the medical
practices of doctors who provide abortions and impose on them requirements that are
different and more burdensome than those imposed on other medical practices.").
95. For examples, see infra text accompanying notes 125-129.
96. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Schimel, 8o6 F.3d. 908, 921 (7th Cir. 2015) ("A
number of other medical procedures are far more dangerous to the patient than abortion,
yet their providers are not required to obtain admitting privileges anywhere, let alone within
30 miles of where the procedure is performed."); Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc.
v. Atchison, 126 F-3d 1042, 1049 (8th Cir. 1997) (criticizing the selective application of a
certificate of need statute to an abortion provider); Planned Parenthood of the Heartland,
Inc. v. Iowa Bd. of Med., 865 N.W.2d 252, 269 (Iowa 2015) (discussing regulation of
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What does Casey have to say about abortion exceptionalism of this kind?
Judges differ profoundly in their understanding of how Casey's undue burden
framework applies to laws that single out abortion for health-justified
restrictions. A debate among judges on the Fourth Circuit illustrates the nature
of this disagreement. At issue was the constitutionality of a South Carolina law
that targeted physicians' offices and medical clinics performing five or more
first-trimester abortions a month with special licensure and operational
requirements." The District Court struck down the regulations as imposing an
undue burden. The requirements were "medically unnecessary," the court said,
imposing "costs and other burdens" that were "not justified by the stated
interest in protecting the health of the women undergoing the procedure."98
The Fourth Circuit reversed, over a dissent objecting that the state law "singles
telemedicine for abortion and observing that "[t]he Board appears to hold abortion to a
different medical standard than other procedures").
Laws prohibiting the "off-label" use of abortion-inducing medication offer a paradigm
case of abortion exceptionalism. In 2011, for example, Oklahoma enacted a law requiring
abortion providers to use an outdated protocol in dispensing the medication that produces
nonsurgical abortion in early pregnancy. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-729a (2015). While one-
third the dose indicated on the drug's final printed label is now regarded in the medical
community as appropriate practice, the Oklahoma law deemed the lower dose a prohibited
"off-label" use. Off-label uses for approved medications are common and do not violate
federal law; notably, an Oklahoma law prohibits health insurers from excluding coverage of
off-label cancer treatments. See OKLA.. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-2604 (2015); see also Respondents'
Brief in Opposition at 5, Cline v. Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice, 133 S. Ct. 2887 (2013) (No.
12-1094).
Off-label use of FDA-approved medications and medical devices is so common as to be
routine. A Mayo Clinic publication in 2012 observed that "[o] ff-label drug uses [OLDU] can
become widely entrenched in clinical practice and become predominant treatments for a
given clinical condition . . . . There are examples of widely practiced OLDUs in every
specialty of medicine." Christopher M. Wittich et al., Ten Common Questions (and Their
Answers) About Off-Label Drug Use, 87 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 982, 983 (2012). "The Supreme
Court itself has noted that off-label use 'is an accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA's
mission.' Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 915 (9th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001)) (enjoining a law
prohibiting off-label use of mifepristone). Judge Moore, dissenting from the Sixth Circuit's
decision upholding Ohio's requirement that doctors use the dosage on the outdated label,
noted that "the Act focuses solely on abortions" and that Ohio continued to permit off-label
uses of the identical medication outside the abortion context. Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio
Region v. DeWine, 696 F. 3d 490, 507 n.17 (6th Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., dissenting in part).
For examples of laws singling out abortion for burdensome health regulation in the
period before Casey, see Gillian E. Metzger, Abortion, Equality, and Administrative Regulation,
56 EMORY L.J. 865, 872 nn.25-27 (2007).
97. Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 66 F. Supp. 2d 691, 694 (D.S.C. 1999), rev'd, 222 F.3d
157 (4th Cir. 2ooo).
ga. Id. at 737.
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out and places additional and onerous burdens upon abortion providers which
are neither justified by actual differences nor rationally related to the state's
legitimate interest in protecting the health and safety of women seeking first-
trimester abortions."" The majority upheld the regulations as protecting
women's health and explained the justification for treating abortion
differently:
It is regrettable that our good colleague in dissent would rule on the
basis that abortion is like any other simple medical procedure that is
directed at injury or disease. Thought of in this way, it is
understandable that he, like the district court, might find many of
South Carolina's regulations unnecessary. Why have inspections, keep
records, and minimize the medical risks for only the abortion procedure, when
such a protocol is not mandated for comparable medical practices addressing
injury and disease? But the importance of the deeply divided societal debate
over the morality of abortion and the weight of the interests implicated by the
decision to have an abortion can hardly be overstated. As humankind is the
most gifted of living creatures and the mystery of human procreation
remains one of life's most awesome events, so it follows that the
deliberate interference with the process of human birth provokes
unanswerable questions, unpredictable emotions, and unintended
social and, often, personal consequences beyond simply the medical
ones.1oo
As these unusually frank judicial exchanges demonstrate, abortion
exceptionalism denotes something more than the fact of singling out abortion
for special, health-justified restrictions. Visible here, but more often submerged
in neutral language, is the notion that there is a special moral valence to
abortion that, because it concerns the unborn, warrants pecial forms of health
regulation not imposed on procedures of comparable risk.
Setting the Fourth Circuit's opinion alongside Casey shows how Casey
rejects abortion exceptionalism of this kind.o' Casey treats with utmost gravity
9g. Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 205 (4th Cir. 2000) (Hamilton, J.,
dissenting). The dissent also observed that the regulation's "sheer breadth is so
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that [Regulation 61-12] seems inexplicable by
anything but animus toward the class that it affects" Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 632 (1996)).
1o. Id. at 175 (emphasis added). On the law's health rationale, see id. at 163.
1o1. For examples of health laws that single out abortion for heightened regulation, see supra
note 96 and accompanying text. For examples of public officials who argue that admitting
privileges laws that single out abortion for regulation protect both women and the unborn,
see infra text accompanying notes 114-116.
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the state's interest in regulating abortion in the interest of protecting unborn
life."o2 It provides the community a means of vindicating this interest:
dissuading women from having an abortion. Yet the Court does not permit
regulation justified as protecting women's health to function as an additional
means of protecting the interest in potential life. Casey allows health-justified
regulation of abortion where consistent with the ordinary regulation of the
practice of medicine. However, Casey objects to "unnecessary" health
regulation whose purpose or effect is to deter women from acting on a decision
to end a pregnancy: "As with any medical procedure, the State may enact
regulations to further the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion.
Unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a
substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden
on the right.""o3
As this passage shows, the undue burden framework prohibits laws that
single out abortion for "unnecessary" health regulations that obstruct access to
abortion. Under Casey, government may not mix regulatory interests and use
health-justified regulations to obstruct access to abortion by nondissuasive
means. For this reason, judicial scrutiny of the facts that justify laws targeting
abortion for onerous health restrictions is necessary to prevent legislatures
from circumventing constitutional limitations that protect women's dignity.
II. THE CLINIC CLOSINGS: PREVENTION, NOT PERSUASION
In recent years, states have enacted laws that impose increasingly
burdensome health restrictions on abortion providers not required of others
who perform health-care procedures of similar risk.' 4 Some laws require
providers to acquire admitting privileges at hospitals that for reasons of
politics, religion, or stigma want nothing to do with doctors who perform
abortions;os others require the clinics to be retrofitted as small hospitals at
unaffordable expense. o6 The practical impact of these health restrictions
102. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (discussing the state's
"profound interest in potential life").
103. Id.
104. See infra notes 125-129 and accompanying text.
ios. See infra notes L31-134 and accompanying text.
106. Medical and public-health authorities reason that ambulatory surgical center requirements
are unnecessary either for medication abortions, which involve no invasion of the body at
all, or for "surgical" abortions, which "do not involve exposure of the uterus to the external
environment" and so do not require the highly sterile environment that ambulatory surgical
centers must maintain. "In short, there has never been a substantial argument in any
accepted scientific or medical literature that further sterility precautions would improve the
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appears to be much greater than that of fetal-protective laws designed to
dissuade women from having an abortion; the latter communicate to one
woman at a time the state's message that abortion is the wrong choice, while
the former can shut down clinics, thus impairing or preventing access
altogether.
In this way, the recently enacted health restrictions dramatically shrink
abortion providers' infrastructure, closing clinics and disabling doctors from
serving their patients.0 7 For example, in overturning Mississippi's admitting
privileges law, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the law imposed an undue
burden because it would have the effect of closing the sole remaining abortion
clinic in the state."os In Texas, the district court blocked House Bill 2 after
observing that the number of abortion clinics in the state had already shrunk
from more than forty to half that number since the law's admitting privileges
requirement took effect in late 2013.'09 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit largely
reversed the district court's injunction, permitting a reduction in the number of
clinics to "at least eight" in the state of Texas.' Judge Posner, in affirming a
already exceptionally low complication rate associated with abortions." Brief for American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 12,
Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, No. 15-274 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015), 2015 WL 5834176, at *12
[hereinafter ACOG Brief].
For an example of these provisions in Texas, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
For the cost imposed by requiring that abortion clinics be rebuilt as "ambulatory surgical
centers," see, for example, Kathryn Smith, Va. Tightens Abortion-Clinic Rules, POLITICO (Apr.
15, 2013), http://www.politico.com/story/2o13/o4/virginia-adopts-stricter-rules-for-abortion
-clinics-90042.html [http://perma.cc/VQ35-3WSS], which notes that the cost of compliance
could require a small abortion and gynecology clinic in Falls Church to "add five rooms and
could cost up to $1 million." See also Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, TRAP Laws
Gain Political Traction While Abortion Clinics-and the Women They Serve-Pay the Price, 16
GUTrMACHER POL'Y REV. 7, 11 (2013).
107. See, e.g., Esm6 E. Deprez, Abortion Clinics Are Closing at a Record Pace, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 24,
2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2ol6-02-24/abortion-clinics-are-closing
-at-a-record-pace [http://perma.cc/VT4M-JJBE] (reporting that, "[s]ince 2011, at least 162
abortion providers have shut or stopped offering the procedure, while just 21 opened," and
that "[s] tate regulations that make it too expensive or logistically impossible for facilities to
remain in business drove more than a quarter of the closings").
1o8. See Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 457-58 (5th Cir. 2014), petition
for cert.filed, 83 U.S.L.W- 3705 (U.S. Feb. 18, 2015) (No. 14-997).
iog. See Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 681 (W.D. Tex. 2014), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th
Cir.), mandate stayed pending judgment by 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015), and cert. granted, 136 S. Ct.
499 (Nov. 13, 2015).
1o. Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F-3d at 597 (emphasis added); see also Manny Fernandez
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preliminary injunction against Wisconsin's admitting privileges law, which
gave doctors one weekend to come into compliance, noted in his opinion for
the Seventh Circuit that the law would have shut down two of the state's four
abortion clinics.' In Alabama, three of the state's five abortion clinics sued to
block the state's admitting privileges law, informing the district court that if
the law went into effect, they would be forced to stop performing abortions."'
Louisiana District Court Judge deGravelles issued a preliminary injunction of
the state's admitting privileges requirement, finding that enforcement of the
law would leave four of the five clinics in the state without an abortion
provider and the last remaining clinic with only one provider."3
Key officials involved in enacting these laws expressed open hostility to
abortion, even as they claimed a health-protective purpose. Shortly after the
Texas admitting privileges and ambulatory surgical center bill was sent to the
House, then-Lieutenant Governor David Dewhurst tweeted a photo of a map
that showed all of the abortion clinics that would close as a result of the bill,
writing: "We fought to pass SB5 thru the Senate last night, & this is why!""'
-abortions.html [http://perma.cc/W3XE-RZYR] (reporting that the number of Texas
clinics will drop from eighteen to ten when the Fifth Circuit's decision goes into effect).
iii. See Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 789 (7th Cit. 2013).
112. See Strange 1, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1276. Judge Thompson declared the law unconstitutional,
reasoning that the Supreme Court "gave us our marching orders in Casey." Strange II, 33 F.
Supp. 3d at 1380. Other states where new health-justified regulations have led to clinic
closings include Arizona, where the number of clinics has dropped from eighteen to six since
201o. Laura Bassett, Anti-Abortion Laws Take Dramatic Toll on Clinics Nationwide,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 26, 2013, 7:30 AM), www.huffingtonpost.com/2ol3/08/26
/abortion-clinic-closures-n_804529.html [http://perma.cc/T6ZF-PYJX]. Five clinics closed
in Ohio, leaving nine in operation, as the result of a 2013 law requiring clinics to have
a patient-transfer agreement with a nearby private hospital; previously, the clinics could
use the more willing public hospitals. Amanda Seitz, Abortion Clinic Stops Procedures,
9 Facilities Remain in Ohio, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Aug. 20, 2014, 12:13 PM),
http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/news/local/sharonville-clinic-to-stop-performing
-abortions/ng56B [http://perma.cc/GF55-3SD3]. One of the two abortion clinics in
Knoxville, Tennessee closed after the state enacted its "Life Defense Act of 2012," requiring
doctors at abortion clinics to have hospital admitting privileges. Kristi L. Nelson, Abortion
Clinic Director Blames New State Lawfor Closure, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL (Aug. 18, 2012),
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/local-news/abortion-clinic-director-blames-new-law-for
[http://perma.cc/C6MZ-FDQ8].
113. June Med. Servs., LLC v. Kleibert, No. 14-CV-00525-JWD-RLB, 2016 WL 320942, at *53
(M.D. La. Jan. 26, 2016) (granting preliminary injunction), appealfiled sub nom. June Med.
Servs., LLC v. Caldwell, No. 16-30116 (5th Cir. Feb. 1o, 2016).
114. David Dewhurst (@DavidHDewhurst), TwITTER (June 19, 2013, 7:41 AM), http://
twitter.com/DavidHDewhurst/status/3473634424973o2S28/photo/1 [http://perma.cc/H4K3
-DD93]; see also Jim Vertuno, Dewhurst Tweet Says Bill Attempt To Close Clinics, STATESMAN
(June 19, 2013, 2:28 PM), http://www.statesman.com/news/news/state-regional-govt
-politics/dewhurst-tweet-says-bill-attempt-close-clinics/nYPwR [http://perma.cc/2SJQ
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Dewhurst quickly backpedaled, tweeting: "I am unapologetically pro-life AND
a strong supporter of protecting women's health. #SB5 does both.""s
Lawmakers have offered similar observations in Mississippi, where an
admitting privileges law threatened to shut down the last clinic in the state. In
a "state of the state" speech delivered on the forty-first anniversary of Roe,
Governor Phil Bryant said:
I believe we have also done an admirable job in protecting our children,
both born and unborn. By strengthening the Child Protection Act and
by requiring that abortionists obtain admitting privileges at local
hospitals, we are protecting women's health. But let me be clear, on this
unfortunate anniversary of Roe versus Wade, my goal is to end
abortion in Mississippi.116
It is unsurprising that states enacting and defending admitting privilege
statutes assert that the laws protect women's health."' Acknowledging a fetal-
-5BDB] (reporting that Dewhurst's comments suggest hat supporters hope to "all but ban"
abortion in Texas).
115. David Dewhurst (@DavidHDewhurst), TWITTER (June 19, 2013, lo:o6 AM),
http://twitter.com/DavidHDewhurststatus/3474ooo87191814145 [http://perma.cc/D9YQ
-Q6YM].
11. Phil Bryant, Miss. Governor, State of the State Address (Jan. 22, 2014), http://
www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2ol4/jan/22/gov-bryants-state-state-speech [http://perma
.cc/RV77-AP75]; see also M.J. Lee, Bill Dooms Only Miss. Abortion Clinic, POLITICO (Apr. 6,
2015, 6:38 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/041/74871.html [http://perma.cc
/848V-A3KZ] (quoting a similar statement from Mississippi State Representative Sam
Mims, the author of the bill); cf Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F.
Supp. 3d 949, 955 (W.D. Wis. 2015) (reporting that Wisconsin's admitting privileges
legislation was proposed to its legislative sponsor by representatives of the state's Right to
Life chapter and was "opposed by the state's leading medical and public health
associations").
The handbook of model antiabortion legislation published annually by Americans
United for Life discusses "admitting privileges" fifty-eight times in its 2015 edition and
includes the requirement in several model laws, including its "Women's Health Protection
Act" and its "Abortion Providers' Admitting Privileges Act." See Defending Life 2015:
Celebrating Ten Years of Defending Life, AM. UNITED FOR LIFE 358, 363 (2015), http://www.aul
.org/downloads/defending-life-2015/AUL DefendingLife2ois.pdf [http://perma.cc/JH7U
-CE9Y].
117. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 789 (7th Cir. 2013)
("The stated rationale of the Wisconsin law is to protect the health of women who have
abortions."); Strange I, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1298 ("The State contends that the statute was
passed only with the purpose of furthering women's health.").
Texas, by contrast, offered shifting rationales for enacting its admitting privileges law.
The official bill analysis for the state senate observes of its admitting privileges law:
"Women who choose to have an abortion should receive the same standard of care any other
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protective justification for the laws -given the laws' role in forcing clinics to
close-would plainly violate the constitutional limits Casey imposes on the
means by which states can protect unborn life.ns
In this Part, we briefly examine the most recent health-justified restrictions
on abortion. Our focus is on the laws requiring abortion providers to have
admitting privileges at local hospitals. We begin by showing that these laws
individual in Texas receives, regardless of the surgical procedure performed. H.B. 2 seeks to
increase the health and safety of a woman who chooses to have an abortion . . . ." TEx.
SENATE RESEARCH CTR., BILL ANALYSIS, H.B. 2 (2013), http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs
/832/analysis/html/HBoooo2E.htm [http://perma.cc/9LL6-JK6K].
Initially, in the district court in Abbott I, Texas argued that its admitting privileges
requirement served to protect maternal health. See State Defendants' Trial Brief at 42,
Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott 1), 951 F. Supp.
2d 891 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (No. 1:13CVoo862) ("HB 2 was enacted to protect the health and
safety of patients."). In trial, see infra note 203, and on appeal, however, the state changed
course and defended the admitting privileges requirement as promoting women's health and
protecting fetal life: "The Texas Legislature enacted the admitting privileges requirement to
promote the health and safety of abortion patients and to advance the State's interest in
protecting fetal life." Appellants' Brief at 2, Abbott II, 748 F.3d 583 (No. 13-51008); see also
Appellants' Reply Brief at 6, Abbott II, 748 F.3d 583 (No. 13-51008) ("The admitting-
privileges requirement was enacted to make abortions safer for patients who choose abortion
and to protect fetal life for those patients who do not."). State officials also embraced the
two state interests. See Fernandez & Eckholm, supra note 11o ("The Texas attorney general,
Ken Paxton, called the Fifth Circuit's decision upholding the law a 'victory for life and
women's health. . . . H.B. 2 both protects the unborn and ensures Texas women are not
subjected to unsafe and unhealthy conditions,' Mr. Paxton said in a statement. 'Today's
decision by the Fifth Circuit validates that the people of Texas have authority to establish
safe, common-sense standards of care necessary to ensure the health of women.'").
When, however, the state defended its admitting privilege and ambulatory surgical
center requirements at the Fifth Circuit in Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, it returned to
describing the state's interest in enacting the law in terms focused solely on protecting
women's health. See Appellants' Brief at 35-36, Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d
563 (5th Cit. 2015) (No. 14-50928) ("The legislature's stated purpose in enacting HB2 was to
improve the standard of care for abortion patients."); see also Appellants' Reply Brief at 29-
31, Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F. 3d 563 (No. 14-50928) (describing how the
requirements specifically improve standards of care for patients seeking abortions).
us. In fact, public officials often talk about admitting privileges laws as protecting both unborn
life and women's health, as officials did in Texas and Mississippi. See supra text
accompanying notes 114-116. For other examples involving the Texas law, see supra note 117;
and infra note 203. Similarly, following a district court judge's preliminary injunction of
Louisiana's admitting privileges law, Louisiana Attorney General Jeff Landry stated, "I am
committed to enforcing our state's pro-life and pro-woman laws. My office and I will
continue to do all we legally can to protect the unborn, their mothers and all Louisiana
women." Micaiah Bilger, Louisiana Judge Overturns Pro-Life Law That Could Close Abortion
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rest on highly contested factual premises. Some but not all courts examine the
state's justifications for health-related restrictions when applying Casey.
Beginning with Judge Posner's 2013 decision in Planned Parenthood of
Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van Hollen,"9 some courts read Casey as requiring an inquiry
into the question of whether a health-justified regulation of abortion will
actually protect women's health. The Fifth Circuit, by contrast, opposes
judicial scrutiny of the state's claims, insisting instead on a rational-basis
review of the state's justifications for enacting the regulation.2 o We review the
courts' competing approaches for their consistency with the Supreme Court's
decisions in Casey and Carhart.
A. The Justificationfor Admitting Privileges Laws
States claim to protect women's health by requiring abortion providers to
have admitting privileges at a local hospital.'2 Yet there are deep questions
about whether evidence supports the alleged benefits to women's health.
Abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy, when eighty-nine percent of
abortions take place,'" is extremely safe, with complications that require a
hospital visit occurring in less than 0.05% of early abortions.' Of this small
number of complications, many are minor, presenting symptoms similar to
those of early miscarriage, which is a common reason for emergency-room
visits and a condition that emergency-room physicians are accustomed to
treating.'"*
Despite the safety of abortion procedures, states single out abortion
for restrictions not imposed on procedures of comparable risk. In Texas,
the district court found that at the time of passage of the state law
imposing admitting privilege and ambulatory surgical center requirements on
abortion, "abortion in Texas was extremely safe with particularly low rates of
11g. 738 F- 3d 786.
120. See Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 68o-8i (W.D. Tex. 2014), affd in
part, vacated in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th
Cir.), mandate stayed pending judgment by 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015), and cert. granted, 136 S. Ct.
499 (Nov. 13, 2015).
121. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
122. Fact Sheet: Induced Abortion in the United States, GrrrMAcHER INST. (July 2014), http://www
.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb inducedabortion.html [http://perma.cc/YX7X-PAHR].
123. Id.
124. See Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 591 (citing testimony of Dr. Jennifer Carnell, an emergency-room
physician, on the minor nature of abortion complications); see also Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at
684 (observing that "before the act's passage, abortion in Texas was extremely safe with
particularly low rates of serious complications").
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serious complications and virtually no deaths occurring on account of the
procedure. . . . [It was] much safer, in terms of minor and serious
complications, than many common medical procedures not subject to such
intense regulation and scrutiny.""' (As the state's safety record might suggest,
prior to passage of the Texas law, abortion procedures were already subject to
rigorous health regulation.)",6 The district court found that, despite this safety
record, the legislature had singled out abortion clinics for restrictions that were
not imposed on facilities providing comparable medical services.'2 7 In
125. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 684.
126. See 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE 55 139.1-.60 (2015) (listing numerous rigorous standards for
abortion facilities including quality-assurance requirements, unannounced inspections, staff
qualifications, physical-space requirements, patient rights, and emergency-service
requirements). Prior to H.B. 2, Texas required licensed abortion clinics to make provisions
for emergencies by either of two alternative means: ensuring that its doctors maintain
admitting privileges at a local hospital or arranging with outside doctors who possessed
admitting privileges to admit the clinic's patients if necessary. 38 Tex. Reg. 6545 (Sept. 27,
2013). This standard follows federal regulation of ambulatory surgical centers. See 42 C.F.R.
§ 416.4 1(b)( 3). However, Texas's new admitting privileges law eliminated the transfer-
agreement option for abortion providers. 38 Tex. Reg. 6539 (Sept. 27, 2013) (declining to
adopt the transfer agreement option generally available to ambulatory surgical centers
"because it conflicts with or at least confuses the [admitting privileges] provision of HB 2
Section 2"); see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a)(1)(A) (West 2015)
(requiring a physician performing or inducing an abortion to have admitting privileges,
with no option for a transfer agreement); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §5 139.53(c)(1), 139-56(a)(1)
(2015) (same). Significantly, doctors performing other types of outpatient surgery retain the
option of entering into a transfer agreement if they themselves do not have admitting
privileges. 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE S 135.n(b)(19 ) (2015) (presenting both options in the
"operating requirements" for Texas ambulatory surgical centers).
127. The law required abortion clinics to meet the standards for ambulatory surgical centers, TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.o1o (a) (West 2015), in the process imposing onerous
new construction requirements:
The ambulatory-surgical-center requirement imposes extensive new standards on
abortion facilities by requiring them to meet enhanced standards for new
construction. See 25 Tex. Admin. Code 5 139.40. The requirement applies equally
to abortion clinics that only provide medication abortion, even though no surgery
or physical intrusion into a woman's body occurs during this procedure. The
standards prescribe electrical, heating, ventilation, air conditioning, plumbing,
and other physical plant requirements as well as staffing mandates, space
utilization, minimum square footage, and parking design.
Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 682. In particular, the district court described how state regulations
implementing the ambulatory surgical center requirements treated abortion providers
differently from other health care providers in decisions concerning eligibility for
grandfathering and waivers:
The requirement's implementing rules specifically deny grandfathering or the
granting of waivers to previously licensed abortion providers. This is in contrast
to the "frequent" granting of some sort of variance from the standards, which
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Wisconsin, the state stipulated before trial that for no other outpatient
procedures were doctors required to have hospital admitting privileges." The
state explained neither the reason for singling out abortion for special
treatment nor the rush to pass its law, which was enacted "precipitously" in
2013.129
occurs in the licensing of nearly three-quarters of all licensed ambulatory surgical
centers in Texas. Such disparate and arbitrary treatment, at a minimum, suggests
that it was the intent of the State to reduce the number of providers licensed to
perform abortions, thus creating a substantial obstacle for a woman seeking to
access an abortion. This is particularly apparent in light of the dearth of credible
evidence supporting the proposition that abortions performed in ambulatory
surgical centers have better patient health outcomes compared to clinics licensed
under the previous regime.
Id. at 685.
The admitting privileges requirement of the new law also treated abortion differently
from other outpatient surgery. While doctors performing other types of outpatient surgery
retain the option of entering into a transfer agreement if they themselves do not have
admitting privileges, the new law eliminated that option for doctors performing abortion.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
128. Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 949, 995 (W.D. Wis. 2015)
(noting that "the legislation inexplicably singles out abortion procedures for special
treatment when the evidence demonstrates that abortion is at least as safe as, and often
much safer than, other outpatient procedures regularly performed in this State"). Among
commonly performed outpatient surgeries for which Wisconsin has not sought to require
admitting privileges are, for example, colonoscopies, arthroscopic surgeries, and
gynecological procedures including dilation and curettage of the uterus. See Planned
Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 789-90 (7th Cir. 2013).
In permanently enjoining enforcement of the law, Judge Posner emphasized that the
state had singled out abortion for regulation it did not impose on riskier procedures. See
Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Schimel, 8o6 F.3d 908, 921 (7 th Cir. 2015) ("A number of
other medical procedures are far more dangerous to the patient than abortion, yet their
providers are not required to obtain admitting privileges anywhere, let alone within 30 miles
of where the procedure is performed."). Judge Posner observed that Wisconsin does not
require that doctors performing outpatient colonoscopies have hospital admitting privileges,
yet "the rate of complications resulting in hospitalization from colonoscopies done for
screening purposes is four times the rate of complications requiring hospitalization from
first-trimester abortions." Id. at 914-15. The respective rates of serious complications from
both procedures are low. Even so, the rate of complications for colonoscopy appears to be
four times that of first-trimester abortions. For colonoscopy, according to the article cited by
Judge Posner, it is 0.2%. Cynthia W. Ko et al., Serious Complications Within 3o Days of
Screening and Surveillance Colonoscopy Are Uncommon, 8 CLIN GASTROENTEROL HEPATOL 166,
171-72 (2010). The comparable rate for first-trimester abortion in a recent peer-reviewed
study of abortion in California was o.o5% (six out of 11,487 abortions). Tracy A. Weitz et al.,
Safety of Aspiration Abortion Performed by Nurse Practitioners, Certified Nurse Midwives, and
Physician Assistants Under a California Legal Waiver, 103 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 454, 459 (2013).
129. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d at 956. Introduced in the state senate on June 4, the legislation
cleared both houses of the legislature in nine days and was signed by the Governor on July 5,
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In defending the need for admitting privileges, states assert that the
requirement serves important credentialing and monitoring functions, assures
necessary "continuity of care," and prevents patient abandonment."'o While the
states' claims imply that doctors who receive admitting privileges are superior
in quality, that is not necessarily the case. Requirements for admitting
privileges may have nothing to do with quality of care.' Many hospitals
condition the award of admitting privileges on a certain number of patient
admissions, setting quotas impossible for most abortion providers to meet
when their patients so rarely need hospital care."' Hospitals may refuse to
extend admitting privileges to doctors who perform a procedure to which the
hospital's governing body has religious objections,133 or may withhold
a Friday. The admitting privileges requirement would have gone into effect immediately
after the weekend had the district court not granted a temporary restraining order. Planned
Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 963 F. Supp. 2d 858, 86o (W.D. Wis. 2013).
13o. See, e.g., Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 592 ("The State focused its defense of the admitting-privileges
requirement on two of these factors: continuity of care and credentialing."); Van Hollen, 738
F.3d at 789 ("[P]roponents of the law argue that if a woman requires hospitalization because
of complications from an abortion she will get better continuity of care if the doctor who
performed the abortion has admitting privileges at a nearby hospital.").
131. Admitting privileges have long been a contentious issue in medical practice. Decisions to
withhold or revoke a doctor's right to admit patients to a hospital and to supervise patient
care are made by committees of doctors according to policies set by the hospital's board.
While on the surface the grant of admitting privileges might appear to signify an objective
measure of quality, that may be far from the case. Anticompetitive and profit-maximizing
motives come into play. "If the privilege decision is based only on medical staff interests, it
may be appropriate to characterize the decision as that of a 'physician cartel' . . . .
[E]conomic reasons exist for medical staff recommendations on privilege issues to be
generally biased against a competitive and efficient allocation of privileges." Philip C.
Kissam et al., Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L.
REV. 595, 604, 61o (1982) (discussing antitrust litigation generated by admissions privileges
decisions). Cases brought against admitting privileges committees have alleged racial and
national-origin discrimination, see, e.g., Gaalla v. Brown, 460 F. App'x 469 (sth Cir. 2012),
and unlawful retaliation for complaints about patient care, see, e.g., Fahlen v. Sutter Cent.
Valley Hosps., 318 P.3d 833 (Cal. 2014).
132. For example, in Wisconsin, hospitals typically require doctors to admit twenty patients a
year in order to retain their privileges. Three doctors in the Wisconsin litigation were
informed by the hospital where they practiced that retaining their admitting privileges
would depend on the hospital's review of five patient admissions within a six-month period,
a standard the doctors testified that they could not meet because they did not expect to
admit any patients. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d at 984-85. For an extended discussion of this
point, see Strange 11, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1342-44. See also Abbott 1, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 9oo-o.
133. Hospitals with religious affiliations or in communities where hostility to abortion runs deep
are particularly likely to reject abortion providers' applications for admitting privileges, as
Judge Thompson explains at length in his opinion striking down Alabama's admitting
privileges requirement. See Strange II, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1341-53. In the Wisconsin case, the
trial judge noted that the plaintiff clinics "credibly argue that the religious affiliation of
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admitting privileges for other unspecified reasons. 4 Patient care is not likely to
be improved by requirements that are medically unnecessary and sufficiently
burdensome to shut down the very facilities at which patients seek care."s
A further concern about the quality of the evidence supporting admitting
privilege requirements has emerged in recent litigation. An activist named
Vincent Rue has organized the set of witnesses who testify across state lines in
support of the admitting privilege statutes."' (Decades ago, Rue played a
hospitals, and in particular Catholic hospitals, may pose a continuing barrier to securing
admitting privileges." Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d at 985. The impact of Catholic abortion
doctrine on the U.S. health care system is not trivial. In 2014, Catholic hospitals accounted
for over nineteen million five hundred thousand emergency room visits and over five
million two hundred thousand admissions every year; one in every six hospital patients
received care in a Catholic hospital. Catholic Health Care, Social Services and Humanitarian
Aid, U.S. CONF. CATH. BISHOPS (2014), http://www.usccb.org/about/media-relations
/backgrounders/health-care-social-service-humanitarian-aid.cfm [http://perma.cc/6YKS
-TQKM]. For discussion of other reasons that hospitals deny admitting privileges, see
ACOG Brief, supra note lo6, at 15-16.
134. In preliminarily enjoining Louisiana's admitting privileges law, Judge deGravelles described
in detail the obstacles facing physicians attempting to comply with the law, including "de
facto denials" and the potential for antiabortion views to infuse credentialing
determinations. See June Med. Servs., LLC v. Kliebert, No. 14-CV-o052S-JWD-RLB, 2016
WL 320942, at *14, 26, 51-53 (M.D. La. Jan. 26, 2016) (order granting preliminary
injunction), appeal filed sub nom. June Med. Servs., LLC v. Caldwell, No. 16-30u16 (5th Cir.
Feb. 10, 2016). The order compares one doctor's attempts to obtain admitting privileges to
"a chapter in Franz Kafka's The Trial." Id. at 25.
135. See ACOG Brief, supra note 1o6, at 14-21 (arguing that the Texas admitting privileges
requirement "does not serve the health of women in Texas" and "presents risks to women's
health by restricting and delaying access to safe abortion"). In the Texas litigation, for
example, Dr. Paul Fine, director of one of the plaintiff clinics, testified that fewer than 0.3%
of patients undergoing first-trimester abortions experience a complication that requires
hospitalization. Another of the plaintiffs witnesses, Dr. Jennifer Carnell, an emergency-
room doctor, testified that admitting privileges were unnecessary as doctors who staff
emergency rooms are trained to treat abortion-related complications, which are similar to
conditions seen with miscarriages, commonly seen in emergency rooms. Abbott II, 748 F.3d
at 591. Yet the imposition of these requirements can close clinics, which in itself imposes
health risks. "The farther a woman must travel to reach an abortion provider, the less likely
she will be to return to that provider for follow-up care and the more dangerous it would be
for her to return in the case of an emergency." Application To Vacate Stay of Final Judgment
Pending Appeal at 17, Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, No. 14A365 (5th Cir. Oct. 6, 2014).
136. Because courts have questioned Rue's professional credibility, he seems to have played a
behind-the-scenes role in organizing expert witnesses who testified that recent restrictions
on abortion promote women's health. See, e.g., Irin Carmon, Who Is Vincent Rue?, MSNBC
(June 10, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/who-vincent-rue [http://perma.cc/8EHM
-EJ9K] ("Rue was involved in recruiting many of the witnesses for the trials in Wisconsin
and Alabama . . . . Many of the same experts had been called upon to justify admitting
privileges laws in other states, including in Texas, where the law has shut down over one
third of the state's abortion clinics."); Molly Redden, Texas Pays 'Thoroughly Discredited'
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central role in developing "post-abortion syndrome" or "PAS," the claim that
abortion traumatizes and inflicts psychological harm on women.)" Rue not
only recruits witnesses to appear in court, but sometimes ghostwrites their
testimony, ,8 and his conduct has drawn reproach from judges in Alabama,
Texas, and Wisconsin.139 For example, Judge Thompson, rejecting one Rue-
recruited expert, said, "Whether Anderson lacks judgment, is dishonest, or is
profoundly colored by his bias, his decision to adopt Rue's supplemental report
and submit it to the court without verifying the validity of its contents deprives
him of credibility.""o In the Texas case, Judge Yeakel had this to say:
The credibility and weight the court affords the expert testimony of the
State's witnesses Drs. Thompson, Anderson, Kitz, and Uhlenberg is
informed by ample evidence that, at a very minimum, Vincent Rue,
Ph.D., a non-physician consultant for the State, had considerable
editorial and discretionary control over the contents of the experts'
reports and declarations. The court finds that, although the experts
testified that they personally held the opinions presented to the court,
the level of input exerted by Rue undermines the appearance of
Expert $42,ooo To Defend Anti-Abortion Law, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 13, 2014), http://
www.motherjones.coM/politics/2ol4/o8/texas-vincent-rue-anti-abortion-law [http://perma
.cc/U8D4-VD4X] ("In the past two years, Republican administrations in four states-
Alabama, North Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin-have paid or promised to pay Rue
$192,205.50 in exchange for help defending anti-abortion laws.").
137. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The Right's Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-
Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1657-60, 1665 n.85, 1681 (2o08).
138. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, A Huge Abortion Win in Texas, SLATE (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www
.slate.con/articles/news and-politics/jurisprudence/2o14/o9/abortion ruling-intexas jud
gejlee.yeakel strikesdownrestrictiveclinic.html [http://perma.cc/7PFL-7NG5] ("Texas
has paid Rue thousands, yet other witnesses tried to mask his role in the case, denying that
he helped draft documents."); Judith Davidoff, Pro-Life Advocate Vincent Rue Assists State in
Wisconsin Abortion Law Defense, ISTHMUS (June 5, 2014), http://www.isthmus.com
/news/news/pro-life-advocate-vincent-rue-assists-state-in-wisconsin-abortion-law-defense/
[http://perma.cc/N9D8-AM44) ("According to the agreements, Rue was hired to assist the
DOJ in the 'development of case strategy, procurement of expert witnesses' and in
'discovery and trial preparation.' He is also a 'liaison between the Office and the experts."');
see also supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing Rue's role in the litigation).
139. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 949, 973 n.24
(W.D. Wis. 2015) (describing Rue as "an advocate of abortion regulations who has been
discredited by other courts because of his lack of analytical rigor and possible personal
biases"); Planned Parenthood v. Strange (Strange Ill), 33 F. Supp. 3d 1381, 1386-88 (M.D.
Ala. 2014); Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 68o n.3 (W.D. Tex. 2014),
affd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 79o F. 3d
563 (5th Cir.), mandate stayed pending judgment by 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015), and cert. granted, 136
S. Ct. 499 (Nov. 13, 2015).
14o. Strange III, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1388.
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objectivity and reliability of the experts' opinions. Further, the court is
dismayed by the considerable efforts the State took to obscure Rue's
level of involvement with the experts' contributions."
B. Judicial Review ofAdmitting Privileges Litigation
How does the dispute over the justification for admitting privileges laws
arise in litigation over the laws' constitutionality? Factual questions concerning
the health justification of such laws are distinct from questions concerning
their impact on abortion access-the "effects" prong of the undue burden
inquiry.
Courts are divided over the need to assess factual justifications for the
restrictions. Led by the Seventh Circuit, some courts require the state to
demonstrate the factual basis of its claim that restricting abortion promotes
women's health; these courts apply undue burden analysis in a weighted
balancing test that attends to the strength of the state's showing that the
restriction achieves that goal.4' The Fifth Circuit, by contrast, asserts that it is
wholly improper for judges to examine the factual basis of the state's claim that
a restriction on abortion promotes women's health. The circuit applies
deferential rational-basis review, simply credits the state's claim to regulate in
the interests of women's health, and then determines whether the law's impact
creates a substantial obstacle." In short, the Seventh Circuit reads Casey as
requiring courts to evaluate the factual basis of the state's claim to restrict
abortion to promote women's health; the Fifth Circuit reads Casey to prohibit
this very inquiry. In what follows, we contrast these two very different
approaches to applying undue burden analysis to health-justified restrictions
on abortion.
The Seventh Circuit's approach to review of admitting privileges
legislation, first articulated by Judge Posner, makes factual support for the
state's health interest central in applying the undue burden test. In December
2013, the Seventh Circuit affirmed an order preliminarily enjoining
enforcement of a recently enacted Wisconsin admitting privileges
141. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 68o n.3. The Fifth Circuit, in upholding the ambulatory surgical
center regulation, failed to note that Judge Yeakel at trial had rejected the credibility of the
only defense expert to testify that the regulation offered health benefits to abortion patients.
That witness, Dr. Thompson, testified that Rue had written portions of her report and
testimony. See Application for a Stay Pending the Filing and Disposition of a Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari at 17 n.7, Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, No. i4A1288 (5th Cir. June 19,
2015). For discussion of the Fifth Circuit's ruling, see infra note 199 and accompanying text.
142. See infra text accompanying notes 144-16o.
143. See infra text accompanying notes 161-176.
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requirement.'" Judge Posner observed that while the state justified the
requirement solely on the ground of protecting women's health, the state's
lawyer at oral argument "did not mention any medical or statistical evidence"
and "[n]o documentation of medical need for such a requirement was
presented to the Wisconsin legislature when the bill that became the law was
introduced on June 4 of this year.""s The medical evidence was "feeble," Judge
Posner said, "yet the burden [was] great."" He explained that the judge had
to consider the evidentiary basis of the state's claim that it had health
justifications for restricting abortion when the judge applied the undue burden
test:
The cases that deal with abortion-related statutes sought to be justified
on medical grounds require not only evidence (here lacking as we have
seen) that the medical grounds are legitimate but also that the statute
not impose an "undue burden" on women seeking abortions. The
feebler the medical grounds, the likelier the burden, even if slight, to be
"undue" in the sense of disproportionate or gratuitous."
Judge Posner derived from Casey two crucially important messages: that
states seeking to justify a health-related restriction must produce evidence
supporting the health basis of their restriction, and that the strength of this
evidentiary showing is relevant in determining whether any related burden on
access is, in Casey's terms, undue. Judge Posner reaffirmed this understanding
in a subsequent opinion permanently enjoining enforcement of Wisconsin's
admitting privileges law.4'
Judge Posner's opinion adopting this weighted balancing test in Planned
Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Van Hollen has proven influential. Judge Thompson
cited it in his Alabama admitting privileges decision three months later,
observing, "[I]t is not enough to simply note that the State has a legitimate
interest; courts must also examine the weight of the asserted interest, including
the extent to which the regulation in question would actually serve that
144. Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2013).
145. Id. at 789.
146. Id. at 798. Judge Posner noted that the requirement would shut down two of the state's four
abortion clinics. Id. at 789.
147. Id. at 798 (citations omitted) (first citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992); then citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); and then citing Mazurek v.
Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997)).
148. Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Schimel, 8o6 F.3d. 908 (7 th Cir. 201); see discussion infra
Section II.C.
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interest."" On this account, the "weight" of an interest turns on a question of
fact: how well the challenged regulation would in fact - "actually" - advance
the interest it is asserted to serve. Judge Thompson explained that the court
was to take the evidence the state amassed justifying the regulation into
account in applying the undue burden framework; he reasoned that "the court
examines the severity of obstacles created by the regulation as well as the
weight of the State's justifications for the regulation, and then determines
whether the obstacle is more significant than is warranted by the
justifications."
5 0
Another recent opinion requiring an inquiry into the factual basis for a
health-justified abortion restriction came from the Ninth Circuit in June 2014.
In Planned Parenthood ofArizona v. Humble, the panel preliminarily enjoined an
Arizona law requiring doctors to use an outdated protocol for administering
the medication that causes an early term abortion.s'5 States have increasingly
attempted to curb the growing popularity of medication abortion's2 by
forbidding doctors to deviate from the dosage on the FDA-approved label -
despite the fact that such "off-label" uses of approved medications are common
outside the abortion context,s5 and the fact that the medical profession has
concluded that, in this instance, a smaller dose is safer and more effective.'
While we have not focused on the medication-abortion controversy,'s Humble
149. Strange I, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1296. As the judge also stated, "[T]he court must determine
whether, examining the regulation in its real-world context, the obstacle is more significant
than is warranted by the State's justifications for the regulation." Id. at 1287.
iso. Id. at 1296-97.
151. 753 F.3d 905 ( 9th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 870 (2014).
152. At Planned Parenthood clinics, medication abortion-accomplished by administering two
prescription drugs, mifepristone and misoprostol -accounts for forty-one percent of first-
trimester abortions. Id. at 907-08.
153. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (noting the Supreme Court's recognition of the
ordinary practice of off-label use).
154. Humble, 753 F.3d at 916-17.
155. Restrictions of this kind have been upheld in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits and struck down
in the Ninth Circuit. Compare Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 604-os (upholding law restricting
medication abortion to dosage on FDA-approved label), and Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio
Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d 490, 514-15 (6th Cir. 2012) (same), with Humble, 753 F. 3d at
917 (preliminarily enjoining the prohibition on off-label use as an undue burden); see also
Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. of Med., 865 N.W.2d 252, 264 (Iowa
2015) (striking down an Iowa regulation prohibiting the use of telemedicine in
administering medication abortion under the Iowa Constitution and applying the federal
undue burden test, reasoning that "[l]ike the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, we believe the
'unnecessary health regulations' language used in Casey requires us to weigh the strength of
the state's justification for a statute against the burden placed on a woman seeking to
1462
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reviews a health-justified restriction on abortion and so is directly relevant to
our discussion.
In Humble, the Ninth Circuit applies Casey with attention to the question of
whether restrictions on abortion are asserted to serve the state's interest in
protecting fetal life or women's health.s' In examining laws asserted to
promote women's health, the circuit employs a weighted balancing test:
[C]ompar[ing] the extent of the burden a law imposes on a woman's
right to an abortion with the strength of the state's justification for the
law . . . [t]he more substantial the burden, the stronger the state's
justification for the law must be to satisfy the undue burden test;
conversely, the stronger the state's justification, the greater the burden
may be before it becomes "undue."11 7
Reviewing Arizona's restriction on medication abortion in Humble, Judge
Fletcher observed that the Ninth Circuit's approach followed from Casey's
direction to determine whether health regulations were "unnecessary," and
approvingly referenced the framework Judge Posner had set forth in Van
Hollen as "an approach much like ours""': "The court in Van Hollen granted a
preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Wisconsin law on the
ground that 'the medical grounds thus far presented . . . are feeble, yet the
burden great.' Here, the 'medical grounds thus far presented' are not merely
'feeble.' They are non-existent.""s' Judge Fletcher noted that "Arizona has
introduced no evidence that the law advances in any way its interest in
women's health.",16 o
The Fifth Circuit's approach to applying Casey differs dramatically. In a
challenge to the Texas admitting privilege requirement in Abbott 11,,6, Judge
Edith Jones asserted that she was following Casey's undue burden framework,
terminate her pregnancy when the stated purpose of a statute limiting a woman's right to
terminate a pregnancy is to promote the health of the woman").
156. Humble, 753 F.3d at 912 (observing "in the context of a law purporting to promote maternal
health, a law that is poorly drafted or which is a pretext for anti-abortion regulation can
both place obstacles in the way of women seeking abortions and fail to serve the purported
interest very closely, or at all" (quoting Tucson Women's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 539-
40 (9th Cir. 2004))).
157. Id. at 912 (citing Eden, 379 F. 3d at 542).
158. Id. at 913.
159. Id. at 917 (citation omitted).
160. Id. at 916.
161. 748 F. 3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014).
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but she then invoked the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v. Carhart62 to
infuse the undue burden inquiry with rational-basis review.' At issue was
precisely the question we have been discussing: whether the undue burden
framework of Casey-Carhart requires judges to examine the factual basis of a
state's claim to restrict abortion in the interest of protecting women's health.
Judge Jones initially characterized Carhart as "holding that the State may
ban certain abortion procedures and substitute others provided that 'it has a
rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue burden.",6 , She then
reversed the district court's finding that the state's admitting privileges law had
no rational relationship to protecting women's health 6 s with a much more far-
reaching claim about the Casey-Carhart framework:
Nothing in the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence deviates from
the essential attributes of the rational basis test, which affirms a vital
principle of democratic self-government. It is not the courts' duty to
second guess legislative factfinding, "improve" on, or "cleanse" the
legislative process by allowing relitigation of the facts that led to the
passage of a law. ... Under rational basis review, courts must presume
that the law in question is valid and sustain it so long as the law is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . As the Supreme
Court has often stressed, the rational basis test seeks only to determine
whether any conceivable rationale xists for an enactment . . . . A law
"based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical
data" satisfies rational basis review. 166
In this remarkable passage, the Fifth Circuit takes the language in Carhart
that applies the undue burden test and uses it to characterize the undue burden
test as rational-basis review-the standard of review championed by the
dissenting justices in Casey.17 Judge Jones suggests that it is beyond the proper
role of a court in a constitutional democracy to inquire into the factual basis of
a legislature's claim that restricts the exercise of the abortion right: "Nothing in
the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence deviates from the essential
attributes of the rational basis test, which affirms a vital principle of democratic
162. Id. at 590.
163. Id. at 590, 594-99.
164. See id. at 590 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007) (emphasis added)).
165. Id. at 595.
166. Id. at 594 (citations omitted).
167. See supra text accompanying note 35.
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self-government.",6 8 She thereafter proceeds to reject the Van Hollen approach
to applying undue burden: "The first-step in the analysis of an abortion
regulation, however, is rational basis review, not empirical basis review.",6
In so reasoning, the Fifth Circuit breaks with the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits, which, as we have seen, understand the inquiry into the evidentiary
basis of the state's claim to regulate in the interests of women's health as part of
the undue burden inquiry. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits understand it as part
of the question of whether the health-justified law was "unnecessary" and
(un)warranted in light of the burdens it imposes on women's access.o In the
Fifth Circuit, by contrast, a court has no reason to examine the state's factual
support for a health-justified restriction on abortion because "[a] law 'based on
rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data' satisfies
rational basis review.""' The Fifth Circuit refuses to consider the strength of
the state's justification for regulating as part of the undue burden inquiry.72
Judge Elrod explains in the Fifth Circuit's subsequent opinion in Whole
Woman's Health v. Lakey,'" admonishing the district court for "evaluat[ing]
whether the ambulatory surgical center provision would actually improve
women's health and safety," that "[i]n our circuit we do not balance the wisdom or
effectiveness of a law against the burdens the law imposes."" Objecting that
examining the factual basis of the state's claim to protect women's health
would "ratchet[] up rational basis review into a pseudo-strict-scrutiny approach by
examining whether the law advances the State's asserted purpose," she reasons that
"[u]nder our precedent, we have no authority by which to turn rational basis
into strict scrutiny under the guise of the undue burden inquiry."s The Fifth
Circuit has recently reaffirmed this line of cases, applying rational-basis review
168. Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 594.
169. Id. at 596.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 142-160.
171. Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 594 (quoting Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508
U.S. 307, 315 (1993), a rational-basis case involving an equal-protection challenge to a
provision of the Cable Communication Policy Act by a regulated party complaining of
market inequities).
172. Id.; see also Abbott I, 734 F.3d at 411 (staying District Court judgment and stating that "[t]he
district court's finding to the contrary is not supported by the evidence, and in any event, 'a
legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational
speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data."' (quoting Beach Commc'ns, 508
U.S. at 315)).
173. 769 F-3d 285, 304-05 (5th Cir.) (overturning the district-court injunction against the Texas
ambulatory surgical center requirement), vacated in part, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014).
174. Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
175. Id. (emphasis added).
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to the claim that Texas's interest in protecting women's health justified
enacting the law. ,6
C. Returning to Casey-Carhart
Is a court required to examine the factual basis of a health-related
regulation, or is it forbidden from doing so? Casey and Carhart offer a clear
answer to the question. In what follows we show how fundamentally the Fifth
Circuit has misapplied those decisions.
The Fifth Circuit has collapsed the Casey-Carhart framework into a form of
rational-basis review that accords virtually no protection to the abortion
decision as a constitutionally protected right. We show, first, that the Fifth
Circuit's use of rational-basis review is inconsistent with the Court's reasoning
in Carhart. We then demonstrate that the Fifth Circuit's use of rational-basis
review destroys the distinction between the state's interests in protecting
potential life and its interest in women's health, and in so doing, permits states
to violate the restrictions Casey imposes on the means by which the state may
protect unborn life."' Finally, we show that the weighted balancing test
employed by the Seventh and the Ninth Circuits is faithful to constitutional
values underlying the Casey-Carhart framework, whereas the Fifth Circuit's
rational-basis review is not.
1. Rational Basis and the Casey-Carhart Framework
The Fifth Circuit's claims about rational basis are not entirely clear. In
Abbott II, Judge Jones initially acknowledges that Carhart applied the undue
burden framework,"8 but she thereafter characterizes the undue burden
framework as a rational-basis test,79 as does Judge Elrod in Whole Woman's
Health v. Lakey. so The Fifth Circuit's per curiam decision in Whole Woman's
Health v. Cole 8' again goes out of its way to reaffirm Abbott II's rational-basis
reasoning. 8, Sometimes the Fifth Circuit treats only the question of whether
176. Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F. 3d 563, 584 (5th Cir.) (affirming the rational-basis
reasoning of Abbott II), mandate stayed pending judgment by 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015), and cert.
granted, 136 S. Ct. 499 (Nov. 13, 2015).
1ry. See supra Section I.B.
178. See supra text accompanying note 164 (quoting Judge Jones).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 166-169.
180. See supra text accompanying note 175.
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an abortion restriction serves the interests of women's health as subject to
rational-basis review.83 At other times, the circuit makes a broader claim: that
the entirety of the undue burden framework is a form of rational-basis
review.'8 ' Whichever account the circuit embraces, its rational-basis claims
flout both Casey and Carhart.
The Casey framework is not rational basis. As we have observed, rational
basis was the standard of review championed by the dissenting justices in
Casey.'8 s Nor did the Court's ensuing decision in Carhart collapse the undue
burden framework into rational basis review. Without a doubt, the Carhart
decision bitterly disappointed the Justices who most fervently defended the
abortion right.'8 That said, even as the majority emphasized the government's
interest in cultivating respect for unborn life, the Court upheld the Partial Birth
Abortion Ban Act on terms that accepted the continuing authority of Casey's
undue burden framework and the protection it provides for first- and second-
trimester abortions.s7
It is true that the Carhart Court refers to rational basis - as we have seen, in
the very sentence in which the Court expressly invokes the undue burden
framework.' Whatever Carhart's reference to "rational basis" means, it is not
directing extravagant deference to the legislature of the kind the Fifth Circuit
requires. In Carhart itself, the Court does not simply defer to Congress.
Significantly, in upholding the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, Justice Kennedy
observes, "The Court retains an independent constitutional duty to review
factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake . . . . Uncritical
deference to Congress' factual findings in these cases is inappropriate."'8 ' The
183. See supra text accompanying notes 161-169.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 161-169.
185. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 966 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("States may regulate abortion
procedures in ways rationally related to a legitimate state interest." (citation omitted)); id. at
981 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[A]pplying the
rational basis test, I would uphold the Pennsylvania statute in its entirety.").
186. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169-91 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
187. See id. at 146 (majority opinion) (reaffirming undue burden and observing "Casey, in short,
struck a balance. The balance was central to its holding. We now apply its standard to the
case at bar."); id. at 153-54 (construing the statute to avoid constitutional questions and
protect ordinary second-trimester abortions).
188. Id. at 158; see also Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 590 (characterizing Carhart as "holding that the State
may ban certain abortion procedures and substitute others provided that 'it has a rational
basis to act, and it does not impose an undue burden"' (quoting Carhart, 550 U.S. at 158)).
189. 550 U.S. at 165-66 ("In cases brought to enforce constitutional rights, the judicial power of
the United States necessarily extends to the independent determination of all questions,
both of fact and law, necessary to the performance of that supreme function." (quoting
1467
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Carhart Court probed and, in two instances, rejected congressional findings
invoked by the government as reasons for enacting the Partial Birth Abortion
Ban Act.19o Probing Congress's reasons behind enacting the challenged statute
is not rational-basis review of the kind that the Fifth Circuit mandates,
especially when the Circuit observed that "[a] law 'based on rational
speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data' satisfies rational basis
review. "'91
In Carhart, the Court does employ a form of deference - though not
rational-basis review that swallows or supplants Casey's undue burden
framework. In Carhart, the Court rejects the argument that Congress was
obliged to provide a health exception to the banned procedure, concluding that
the statute withstood at least a facial challenge.' The Court grounds this
conclusion in the district courts' findings that medical opinion was divided on
the need for such an exception,'93 reasoning that "[t]he Court has given state
and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there
is medical and scientific uncertainty."' The condition of medical uncertainty
is established through judicial review -in Carhart itself, this was done through
the factfinding of the district courts.
In Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, the Fifth Circuit seizes on this language
as additional warrant for judicial deference, asserting that "medical uncertainty
underlying a statute is for resolution by legislatures, not the courts."95 The
Circuit is wrong to rely on this language as it does. The medical uncertainty of
which the Court spoke in Carhart was anchored in the factfinding of the two
district courts whose judgments were on review. By contrast, the Fifth Circuit
finds uncertainty by rejecting the factfinding of the district court. In the Texas
case, the district court probed the justification of the legislature for enacting
H.B. 2 and found no credible evidence to support either the admitting privilege
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 6o (1932))); see also Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v.
Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing these passages of Carhart).
190. 550 U.S. at 165-66 (drawing on evidence presented in the district courts to reject the claim
that no medical schools provided training in the abortion method banned by the statute and
the claim that "the prohibited procedure is never medically necessary").
191. Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 594 (citations omitted).
192. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 166-67.
193. Id. at 143-44.
194. Id. at 163.
195. 790 F.3d 563, 587 (5th Cir.) (chastising the trial court for "substituting its own judgment for
that of the legislature"), mandate stayed pending judgment by 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015), and cert.
granted, 136 S. Ct. 499 (Nov. 13, 2015).
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requirement or the ambulatory surgical center requirement.6 The Fifth
Circuit found uncertainty in the record, rejecting the district court's findings
and instead crediting the State's contrary assertions."' Throughout, the circuit
court chastised the district court, admonishing that "[i]t is not the courts' duty
to second guess legislative factfinding, improve on, or cleanse the legislative
process by allowing relitigation of the facts that led to the passage of a law."1 8
In short, the "uncertainty" the Fifth Circuit finds to warrant deference to the
legislature is produced in significant part by deferring to the legislature. If
appellate courts can justify deference to the legislature by invoking medical
uncertainty that is untethered from facts found and credibility determinations
made by the trial court,'99 they can easily erode protections for constitutional
rights. Whatever deference Carhart might be read to warrant, it cannot be the
extravagant deference to the legislature that the Fifth Circuit practices here.
2. How Review ofHealth-Justified Restrictions Protects the Decisional Right
Casey Recognizes
At root, the Fifth Circuit's extravagantly deferential "rational-basis"
decisions err in reasoning about the review of abortion restrictions as if they
were ordinary social and economic legislation unconnected to constitutional
rights. The Circuit fails to protect the decisional right the Casey-Carhart
framework recognizes. States may have a right to regulate the practice of
abortion, but, even after Carhart, that prerogative is by no means
unconstrained or absolute. In Carhart, the Court emphasized that Casey's
undue burden standard "struck a balance" between protecting "the woman's
exercise of the right to choose" and the ability of the state to "express profound
respect for the life of the unborn."2" To preserve this balance and protect a
196. Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 684-685 (W.D. Tex. 2014), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563.
197. On admitting privileges, see Cole, 790 F.3d at 587 (explaining why Abbott II "disavowed the
inquiry employed by the district court"). On the ambulatory surgical center requirement,
see id. at 584-86.
198. Id. at 587 (quoting Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 594). The same opinion says "[t]he district court
erred by substituting its own judgment for that of the legislature . ... " Id.
199. The district court found that the testimony of the state's key expert witnesses lacked "the
appearance of objectivity and reliability" because a nonphysician third party exerted
"considerable editorial . . . control" over the contents. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 68o n.3. In
finding "medical uncertainty," the Fifth Circuit rejected the findings of the district court and
endorsed the state's evidence without ever mentioning the adverse credibility findings made
by Judge Yeakel. See Cole, 790 F.3d at 585.
200. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) (citations omitted).
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woman's right to make "the ultimate decision""' about whether to carry a
pregnancy to term, Casey imposed constitutional limits on the means by which
the state could vindicate its interest in protecting potential ife." Government
must persuade women to continue a pregnancy; it cannot obstruct women's
access to abortion.
As we have shown, protecting the woman's exercise of the right to choose
requires judges sharply to distinguish between restrictions on abortion asserted
to protect women's health from those asserted to protect unborn life in order to
ensure that state efforts to protect unborn life remain dissuasive in form, as
Casey requires. Judicial review that probes the factual basis of the state's claim
to restrict abortion in the interests of protecting women's health thus protects
the exercise of the decisional right that Casey recognizes.
The Texas law demonstrates how a state can enact weakly justified health
restrictions on abortion that obstruct women's efforts to end a pregnancy in
ways that do not involve reasoning with women or attempting to dissuade
them as Casey requires. Strikingly, as it defended the Texas statute, the state
offered a series of different characterizations of its underlying justification, over
time coming to describe the admitting privileges law as protecting both
women's health and unborn life." Judge Yeakel criticized the state for
201. Planned Parenthood of Sc. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
202. See supra text accompanying note 41.
203. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing the state's shifting characterization of
its interests in enacting the admitting privileges and ambulatory surgical center
requirements in Abbott I and Cole). In Abbott I, the state began by defending the admitting
privileges requirement as protecting women's health, see supra note 117 and accompanying
text, but, in arguing the case, the State's Solicitor General invoked both women's health and
fetal life as rationales:
The plaintiffs' arguments in this case rest on a mistake in premise, that the
challenged provisions of House Bill 2 were enacted exclusively for the purpose of
protecting the health and safety of abortion patients. House Bill 2 was indeed
enacted for that purpose. But the hospital admitting privileges requirement and
the regulations on abortion-inducing drugs also served to advance the State's
interest in protecting fetal life, an interest that the plaintiffs never acknowledge in
any of their briefing. . . . It's important to consider our disagreements with the
plaintiffs in light of these dual interests at stake - the State's interest in promoting
maternal health and the State's interest in protecting the life of the unborn
child. . . . First, these laws were not enacted solely to advance the State's interest
in maternal health. They were also enacted to advance the State's interest in
promoting and protecting fetal life. A law that is enacted to advance the State's
interest in the life of the unborn need not be medically necessary to survive
constitutional challenge.
Transcript of Record at 27-28, Abbott I, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891 (No. 1-13-CV-oo862-LY)
(quoting Jonathan Mitchell, Texas Solicitor General, in his opening argument). In closing
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attempting to supplement health-protective justifications with fetal-protective
justifications, reasoning that under Casey it was unconstitutional for the state
to protect unborn life by creating "obstacles to previability abortion" rather
than by counseling against the decision to seek an abortion:
The primary interest proffered for the act's requirements relate to
concerns over the health and safety of women seeking abortions in
Texas. To the extent that the State argues that the act's requirements
are motivated by a legitimate interest in fetal life, the court finds those
arguments misplaced. In contrast to the regulations at issue in Casey, the
act's challenged requirements are solely targeted at regulating the performance
of abortions, not the decision to seek an abortion. Here, the only possible
gain realized in the interest of fetal life, once a woman has made the
decision to have a previability abortion, comes from the ancillary effects
of the woman's being unable to obtain an abortion due to the obstacles
imposed by the act. The act creates obstacles to previability abortion. It does
not counsel against he decision to seek an abortion."4
Judge Yeakel thus understood that preserving Casey's framework requires first,
distinguishing fetal-protective and health-protective justifications for abortion
restrictions, and second, probing the factual basis of health-justified
restrictions to ensure they serve health-related ends.
In reversing Judge Yeakel and rebuking him for examining the evidence
that supported the state's claim to restrict abortion in the interests of
protecting women's health,"os Judge Elrod never responded to his objection
that Texas was protecting potential life by nondissuasive means, and was
therefore violating Casey's protection for women's decisional autonomy. The
argument, the State's Deputy Solicitor General also invoked both interests to justify the
admitting privileges law:
Well, Your Honor, abortion is unique in the sense that there are competing
interests that are at stake that are not just maternal health. As we have explained,
there's an ample maternal health justification for the provision, but there's also
the fetal life interest that the State has. So the fact that there are both of those
interests makes it a little bit different than having an outpatient tonsillectomy or
something.
Transcript of Record at 40-41, Abbott I, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891 (No. 1-13-CV-oo862-LY)
(quoting Andrew Oldham, Texas Deputy Solicitor General, in his closing argument).
204. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 684 (emphasis added).
205. Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 297 (5th Cir.) ("In our circuit, we do not
balance the wisdom or effectiveness of a law against the burdens the law imposes."), vacated
in part, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014).
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Fifth Circuit's hyperdeferential practice of rational-basis review expressly
sanctions this fusion and scrambling of rationales.
One could explain the Fifth Circuit's failure to protect women's decisional
autonomy as an expression of deference to the state's interest in protecting
potential life. But one could also explain the Fifth Circuit's failure to protect
women's decisional autonomy as an expression of a very particular view of
women, one that elevates their reproductive capacity over other attributes of
personhood in an explicit manner not seen in a judicial opinion for many years.
When the parties in Abbott II called upon the Fifth Circuit to differentiate
review of abortion laws enacted to protect potential life and to protect women's
health, Judge Jones refused, reasoning that "no such bifurcation has been
recognized by the Supreme Court.",o 6 She then asserted that the two interests
cannot be bifurcated because laws that protect a woman's health protect her as a
childbearer: "[T]he state's regulatory interest cannot be bifurcated simply
between mothers' and children's health; every limit on abortion that furthers a
mother's health also protects any existing children and her future ability to
bear children even if it facilitates a particular abortion."M7
As the Ninth Circuit understands but the Fifth Circuit does not, Casey's
undue burden framework requires courts to differentiate the state's interests in
protecting potential life and women's health."n In protecting women's health,
the government is not protecting potential life, a conflation of interests the
Fifth Circuit sanctioned in Abbott II and the Fourth Circuit sanctioned in
Greenville.2 o" The government has long regulated women's conduct with the
view that women are defined by their role in childbearing, an understanding
2o6. Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 590. Judge Jones is wrong. Both Roe and Casey clearly distinguish the
government's interests in regulating abortion to protect women's health and to protect
unborn life. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
207. Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 590. We observe that in its most recent decision, the Fifth Circuit
seems to have retreated from this position. It characterizes the purpose of the Texas law as
protecting "the health and welfare of women seeking abortions." Whole Woman's Health v.
Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 584 (5th Cir.) (citing the state senate committee's bill analysis), mandate
stayed pending judgment by 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015), and cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 499 (Nov. 13,
2015).
208. For the Ninth Circuit's insistence on separating review of legislation protecting potential life
and review of legislation protecting women's health, see supra note 156 and accompanying
text.
209. Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 205 (4th Cir. 2000); see discussion supra
text accompanying notes 99-101). The Texas Solicitor General's Office also embraces the
dual-interest account of its own health restrictions, see supra note 203 and accompanying
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the Court endorsed more than a century ago in Muller v. Oregon.2o But Casey
rejects this traditional view of women" and instead insists that respect for
women's dignity requires giving women control over the decision whether to
become a mother. 12 That is why the undue burden test restricts the means by
which the government may protect unborn life: the government cannot
prevent women from obtaining an abortion but instead must, if it chooses,
seek to persuade women to bring a pregnancy to term through the provision of
truthful, nonmisleading information.
3. Comparing Review ofHealth-Justified Restrictions Across Circuits
As courts outside the Fifth Circuit understand, judicial review that
differentiates between the state's interest in protecting potential life and the
state's interest in protecting women's health secures Casey's protection for
women's decisional autonomy. Ensuring that health-justified restrictions
actually and effectively serve health-related ends is, of course, also required by
Casey's language prohibiting "unnecessary" health laws that impose "undue
burdens."3
Outside the Fifth Circuit, proper judicial review under Casey takes at least
two forms. First, judges look to weak evidence in support of a health-
restriction in finding violations of the undue burden standard's purpose
prong.1 4 For example, in Wisconsin, Judge Conley ruled that the state's
admitting privileges law was enacted for the improper purpose of imposing a
210. See 2o8 U.S. 412, 422 (1908) ("Even though all restrictions on political, personal, and
contractual rights were taken away, and she stood, so far as statutes are concerned, upon an
absolutely equal plane with him, it would still be true that she is so constituted that she will
rest upon and look to him for protection; that her physical structure and a proper discharge
of her maternal functions -having in view not merely her own health, but the well-being of
the race -justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the passion of man.").
211. The portion of the Casey decision attributed to Justice Kennedy rejects this traditional
understanding of women's roles precisely as it affirms women's liberty interest in deciding
whether to become a mother, free of government control. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) ("[A woman's] suffering is too intimate and personal for
the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however
dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and our culture. The destiny of
the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual
imperatives and her place in society.").
212. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
213. See supra text accompanying note 75.
214. Casey, of course, invites this inquiry into improper purpose when it explains that "[a]
finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus." Casey, 5oS U.S. at 877.
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substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion.2 1 ' He rested this judgment on
classic indicia of pretext: the state introduced no evidence in support of the
admitting privileges law, imposed the requirement with one weekend's notice,
and targeted abortion providers only, exempting procedures of greater risk."
In affirming the trial court's finding of a purpose to impose a substantial
obstacle, Judge Posner additionally emphasized the fact that the state had
singled out abortion for health requirements that it hadn't imposed on
procedures of greater risk:
Opponents of abortion reveal their true objectives when they procure
legislation limited to a medical procedure- abortion- that rarely
produces a medical emergency. A number of other medical procedures
are far more dangerous to the patient than abortion, yet their providers
are not required to obtain admitting privileges anywhere, let alone
within 30 miles of where the procedure is performed. 217
Inconsistent conduct, singling out abortion, or weak factual support for the
restriction can supply objective evidence of unconstitutional purpose.
("Wisconsin appears to be indifferent to complications of any other outpatient
procedures, even when they are far more likely to produce complications than
abortions are.",),8
Yet proof of collective purpose is difficult-even when purpose is not
defined by difficult-to-satisfy liability rules of the kind that prevail in the equal
protection area" -because judges are generally reticent to accuse state
legislators of bad faith.22 This problem seems especially acute in the abortion
215. See Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 949, 994-96 (W.D.
Wis. 2015); cf Abbott I, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 901 (finding that health-justified restriction
lacked a rational basis).
216. See Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d. at 994-96. For another example of a trial judge finding
improper purpose under the undue burden framework, see Whole Woman's Health v.
Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 685 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (concluding "that the ambulatory-surgical-
center requirement was intended to close existing licensed abortion clinics"), affd in part,
vacated in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th
Cir.), mandate stayed pending judgment by 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015), and cert. granted, 136 S. Ct.
499 (Nov. 13, 2015).
217. Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 8o6 F-3d. 908, 921 (7th Cir. 2015).
218. Id. at 914.
2ig. For a discussion of the evolution of the standards for proving discriminatory purpose
toward an increasingly difficult-to-satisfy liability rule, see Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme
Court, 2012 Term-Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARv. L. REV. 1, 9-23 (2013).
220. For instance, in Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 791 (7th
Cir. 2013), the court stated:
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context. Even if the legislators who enact a health-justified restriction on
abortion publicly announce their aim to limit access to the procedure," judges
may understand such legislators to act for benign rather than bigoted ends, a
difference that, for many, may mitigate the legislators' choice of
unconstitutional means - especially if the purpose of the law is considered
without attention to the law's impact on women.
Considering the factual support for a health restriction under the effects
prong of the undue burden inquiry avoids some of the difficulties of a purpose-
focused approach. The weighted balancing test that Judge Posner employed in
applying the undue burden framework to health-justified restrictions can be
understood as smoking out unconstitutional motivation without ever requiring
judges to identify direct evidence of illicit purpose. Examining the facts that
justify a health regulation is also important in evaluating the law's effects.
Considering the extent to which a law advances the state's interest in
protecting health is crucial in determining whether the burden it imposes on
women's choice is warranted: "The feebler the medical grounds, the likelier the
burden, even if slight, to be 'undue' in the sense of disproportionate or
gratuitous."" A weighted balancing test of this kind seems to faithfully
implement Casey's directions to judges to distinguish between necessary and
"unnecessary" health regulations." The weight of the health justification for a
Discovering the intent behind a statute is difficult at best because of the collective
character of a legislature, and may be impossible with regard to the admitting
privileges statutes. Some Wisconsin legislators doubtless voted for the statute in
the hope that it would reduce the abortion rate, but others may have voted for it
because they considered it a first step toward making invasive outpatient
procedures in general safer.
22i. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 114-11S.
222. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 798. Judge Posner has expressly reaffirmed this framework:
To determine whether the burden imposed by the statute is "undue" (excessive),
the court must "weigh the burdens against the state's justification, asking
whether and to what extent the challenged regulation actually advances the state's
interests. If a burden significantly exceeds what is necessary to advance the state's
interests, it is 'undue,'" which is to say unconstitutional. The feebler the medical
grounds (in this case, they are nonexistent), the likelier is the burden on the right
to abortion to be disproportionate to the benefits and therefore excessive.
Schimel, 806 F.3d at 919-20 (citing Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905,
913 (9th Cir. 2014)).
223. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) ("As with any medical
procedure, the State may enact regulations to further the health or safety of a woman
seeking an abortion. Unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of
presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden
on the right."). The Ninth Circuit similarly justifies the weighted balancing test it employs
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law is thus relevant to the effects as well as the purpose prongs of the Casey
inquiry: as Judge Posner observed, if the state's showing of health need is
weak, a judge has stronger grounds for finding the law's impact on access to be
"undue."'
This method of incorporating the evidence in support of a health-justified
restriction on abortion into the undue burden inquiry seems to us
unquestionably correct. Undue means unwarranted. Undue means
disproportionate. Undue is a relative judgment. As the judges who employ the
weighted balancing test understand, the question of what adverse effects are
"undue" depends on the strength of the state's demonstration of a health
justification for the restriction on abortion-on whether a restriction is
"unnecessary" to protect women's health and hence imposes an "undue
burden" on women's access to abortion.
Precisely because undue means unwarranted or disproportionate, the
judgment about which adverse effects are undue requires balancing the extent
to which a law advances the state's interests against the burdens the law will
impose on the exercise of a woman's constitutional right. For this reason,
judgments about which burdens are undue will vary across contexts. The
proposition might seem unremarkable, but it stands dramatically at odds with
the practice of courts that derive rules from Casey about the kinds of adverse
effects that are licit under the undue burden test.
Exemplary are decisions of the Fifth Circuit that purport to derive from
Casey rules of general application about driving distances and undue burdens.
Consulting the record in Casey, Judge Owen observed:
In Casey, the Supreme Court considered whether a Pennsylvania statute
that de facto imposed a twenty-four-hour waiting period on women
seeking abortions constituted an undue burden. The Court concluded
that it did not, despite the fact that it would require some women to
make two trips over long distances. An increase in travel distance of less
to enforce Casey as following from the Court's instructions to bar "undue" burdens and
"unnecessary" health regulations. See Humble, 753 F.3d at 912-13.
224. See supra text accompanying note 147. In reversing Judge Yeakel's conclusion that Texas's
ambulatory surgical center requirement was enacted for the purpose of closing clinics, the
Fifth Circuit dismissed the evidence on which the district-court judge focused as "purely
anecdotal" and, citing Casey, reasoned that the plaintiffs "failed to prove that [the law]
'serve[s] no purpose other than to make abortions more difficult.'" Whole Woman's Health
v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 585-86 (5th Cir.) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 901), mandate stayed pending
judgment by 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015), and cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 499 (Nov. 13, 2015). But Casey
does not only inquire into improper purpose. It asks judges to evaluate whether the evidence
shows that health-justified abortion restrictions are "unnecessary." Casey, 5 U.S. at 878.
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than 150 miles for some women is not an undue burden on abortion
rights.15
Judge Jones approvingly affirmed and extended this reasoning:
[T]he Supreme Court recognized that the 24-hour waiting period
would require some women to make two trips over these [long]
distances . . . [and] nonetheless held that the Pennsylvania regulation
did not impose an undue burden. We therefore conclude that Casey
counsels against striking down a statute solely because women may
have to travel long distances to obtain abortions. 6
Here, as elsewhere, the Fifth Circuit distorts Casey. The joint opinion
evaluated the constitutionality of the driving distances in question as effects of a
statute imposing a twenty-four-hour waiting period;"' the joint opinion judged
these burdens acceptable (not "undue") because they were an incident of the state's
effort to dissuade women from ending a pregnancy. The opinion could not be
clearer: "Because the informed consent requirement facilitates the wise exercise
of [the abortion] right, it cannot be classified as an interference with the right
Roe protects.""8 The form of the restriction mattered centrally to authors of the
joint opinion as they determined what burdens on exercise of the right were
undue:
What is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate decision, not
a right to be insulated from all others in doing so. Regulations which
do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or
the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the
life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to
the woman's exercise of the right to choose.
225. Abbott 1, 734 F.3d at 415 (footnote omitted). The joint opinion did not in fact establish any
mileage limit below which a regulation might be immunized from undue burden review. It
simply acknowledged that the waiting period might require "some women" to make a prior
trip of some unspecified distance before obtaining an abortion on the second trip. See Casey,
505 U.S. at 886-87. The district court in Casey had found as a matter of fact that the nearest
abortion clinic for women in sixty-two of the state's sixty-seven counties was at least one
hour and sometimes more than three hours away. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1352 (E.D. Pa. 1990), affd in part, rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d
Cir. 1991), affd in part, rev'd inpart, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
226. Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 598.
227. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-87.
228. Id. at 887.
229. Id. at 877.
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As these passages of Casey illustrate, the question of whether an adverse
effect or burden is undue depends on the manner in which the state is
vindicating its interest in regulating abortion. Burdens that the joint opinion
found acceptable as an incident of the state's efforts to dissuade women from
seeking an abortion do not represent generally acceptable measures of the
burdens the state may inflict on women when it closes clinics for unnecessary
or weakly supported health reasons.
Beyond this, the deeper error of the Fifth Circuit's reading of Casey is its
claim to apply the undue burden standard-a standard that vindicates a
constitutional value-as a context-insensitive rule. The Court embraced the
undue burden framework as a way to protect women's liberty: the conditions
in which women would exercise their constitutionally protected choice whether
to become a mother.2 30 Casey protects women's liberty by restricting the means
by which the government may protect potential life. If the government chooses
to protect potential life, it may not obstruct women's access to abortion, but
must persuade women to choose motherhood by means that respect women's
dignity.
In upholding a law that was enacted for the nominal purpose of protecting
women's health, yet would foreseeably shut down most abortion clinics in the
state -leaving millions of Texas women to exercise the choice Casey protects by
driving hundreds of miles, if they can3' - the Fifth Circuit mocks Casey," if
not the Constitution itself.
230. See id. at 874 ("Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability
to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause."); see also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 225-226 and accompanying text (discussing the kinds of burdens the Fifth
Circuit claims that Casey allows government to impose on a woman deciding whether to
become a mother).
232. in a state where public officials openly discuss a law that purports to protect women's health
as designed to protect the unborn and to close abortion clinics, see supra notes 114-115, 117-
118 and accompanying text, the Fifth Circuit repeatedly reverses and rebukes a trial judge for
examining the state's justification for enacting the law, see supra text accompanying note 174.
In so doing, the Fifth Circuit purports to apply Casey and Carhart, yet ignores language in
those cases that directs a court to examine the factual basis of the state's claim to protect
women's health. See supra notes 72-81, 189-190 and accompanying text.
As the Fifth Circuit well appreciates, if courts cannot examine the state's reasons for
restricting the exercise of constitutional rights, they are scarcely rights at all. Cf New Anti-
Abortion Legislation Requires Doctors To Scale 18-Foot Wall Surrounding Clinic, ONION
(July 22, 2014), http://www.theonion.com/article/new-anti-abortion-legislation-requires-
doctors-to-36514 [http://perma.cc/43HB-2SSG] (reporting a new state law that requires
doctors to climb an eighteen-foot wall to enter a medical facility that provides abortions,
explaining that "[t]he Clinic Fortification and Physician Excellence Act calls for the
construction of concrete barriers nearly two stories tall and 4 feet thick around all clinics
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CONCLUSION
Casey's language and its logic both point in the same direction: Casey
requires judges to weigh the evidence supporting a health restriction on
abortion against its impact on women's access. If judges do not do so,
"unnecessary health regulations" will erode constitutional protection for
women's choices. Casey requires states to protect potential life by means that
respect women's dignity. The Court has reaffirmed constitutional protections
for dignity in Lawrence v. Texas" (where Justice Kennedy quotes Casey
explicitly)," and more recently in United States v. Windsors and Obergefell v.
Hodges. ,6 No less is required here.
Casey is not the opinion either of us would have written. Each of us believes
the Constitution rightly understood provides more substantial protections for a
woman's decision whether to become a mother, especially given the
exclusionary ways this nation has treated those who bear and rear children.
That said, there are reasons for the Court to stand behind its quarter-
century-old decision that reach beyond stare decisis. We understand Casey to
represent the Court's good-faith effort to pronounce the Constitution's
meaning for a divided nation. With Americans in bitter disagreement about the
abortion question, the Court invoked the Constitution as a ground on which
they were united and on which they could be asked to recognize each other's
views. In Casey, the Court interpreted the Constitution in a "call[] [for] the
contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by
accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution."3 7 The Court
offering abortion services, and for physicians working at these sites to scale such barricades
unassisted, a landmark piece of legislation that supporters hailed as a victory for women's
health").
233. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
234. Id. at 574 ("'These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State."' (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851)).
235. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); see, e.g., id. at 2691-92, 2696.
236. 135 S. Ct. 2585 (2015); see, e.g., id. at 2597, 2608.
237. Casey, 505 U.S. at 866-67 ("Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court
decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected
in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a dimension that the resolution of
the normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court's
interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end
their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.").
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allowed the states more latitude to protect potential life if the states did so by
means the Court understood to respect a woman's constitutionally protected
decision whether to become a mother. As a nation divided, we need practices of
mutual respect no less today than we did in 1992.
Casey did not authorize health-justified restrictions on abortion that are in
fact unnecessary to protect women's health and that obstruct women's access
to abortion. Judges who are willing to accept Casey understand this and strike
down the regulations we have discussed here. Judges at war with Casey defer to
the states' rationales in the face of overwhelming evidence that the health
justifications for the restrictions offer a fig leaf for the expression of
antiabortion sentiment.
The stakes are high as the Court reviews a new generation of abortion
restrictions that do not simply communicate the state's preference for
childbirth but instead threaten wholesale destruction of the clinic
infrastructure that enables women to exercise their constitutional right. Will
states be permitted to restrict abortion in ways the Constitution prohibits
merely by relabeling an interest in protecting unborn life as an interest in
protecting women's health? Sanctioning laws of this kind threatens to make
hollow the right Casey reaffirmed- all the more acutely so for the growing
number of women living in jurisdictions hostile to abortion.
We have frequently referred here to women's dignity as a value that Casey
sought to protect. At this crucial juncture in the never-ending abortion
controversy, we suggest that courts must also be attentive to another claim to
dignity: the dignity of law itself. If the decision announced nearly a generation
ago under an intense public spotlight can be so easily manipulated and evaded,
among the betrayed will be not only the women of America, but the
understanding that Casey affirmed: that constitutional law matters, and
matters especially in those precincts where we most deeply disagree.
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